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HILARY J. ALLEN* 
Abstract: The processing of retail payments traditionally has been the domain of 
regulated banks, but technologically sophisticated players like Venmo, AliPay, 
Bitcoin, and Ripple, and potentially, Facebook’s Libra, are making incursions in-
to the market. Even within regulated banks, payments processing is becoming in-
creasingly reliant on new technologies—JPMorgan Chase’s “JPMCoin” is just 
one example. Limited attention, however, has been paid to the new kinds of op-
erational risks associated with these methods of processing retail payments. This 
Article argues that technological failures at a payments provider—either a bank 
or non-bank—could be amplified in unexpected ways as such failures interact 
with technological failures at other payments providers. In a worst-case scenario, 
a cascading failure of payments technologies could cause significant parts of the 
retail payments system to shut down—an eventuality that would harm the broad-
er economy if people were unable to transact for a prolonged period of time. This 
Article is the first to raise the possibility of a financial crisis precipitated primari-
ly by operational failures. Such a crisis would look more like a rolling blackout 
than a bank run. Because of this possibility, this Article argues that it is insuffi-
cient to approach the risk of payments failure with a purely prudential strategy. 
This Article therefore makes the case for a complementary “macro-operational” 
approach to regulation, rooted in complexity theory, to deal with the possibility 
that the systemic interactions of operational risks could hobble our retail pay-
ments system—and the broader economy. Using this framework, this Article ana-
lyzes the potential threats posed by different technologies and business models to 
the orderly functioning of our retail payments system. Further, this Article sug-
gests the beginnings of what proactive macro-operational regulation of the retail 
payments system might look like. 
INTRODUCTION 
Imagine that, even if you had the money, you were suddenly unable to 
pay for goods and services. Imagine how quickly your day-to-day life would 
be impacted if you could not pay for food, gas, or rent. How long would it take 
                                                                                                                           
 © 2021, Hilary J. Allen. All rights reserved. 
 * Associate Professor, American University Washington College of Law. Many thanks to Dan 
Awrey, Dick Berner, Pat McCoy, David Min, JB Ruhl, Rory Van Loo, Yesha Yadav and to partici-
pants in the National Business Law Scholars Conference and the American University Washington 
College of Law Business Faculty Workshop series for helpful discussions and comments on earlier 
drafts. 
2021] Payments Failure 455 
for an economy to contract if consumers were no longer able to transact with 
businesses and employers were no longer able to pay their employees? A cyber 
attack could certainly generate these nightmarish outcomes, and there is nas-
cent work being done on managing the systemic risks associated with cyber-
threats to the financial system.1 But cyber attacks are not the only threat we 
should be concerned about. This Article argues that even in the absence of any 
nefarious attack, the financial system could be incapacitated by compounding 
technical glitches. As retail payments processing becomes increasingly techno-
logically complex, we need to consider the possibility of a financial crisis driv-
en primarily by technological failures cascading through the financial sys-
tem—a crisis, in other words, that looks more like a rolling blackout than a 
bank run. After all, as economists Kirilenko and Lo have quipped, “[W]hatever 
can go wrong will go wrong faster and bigger when computers are involved.”2 
Fears of payments failure have long motivated government intervention 
in the financial system, but in the past, when consumers predominately made 
retail payments with cash or checks, catastrophes could be kept at bay so long 
as the banks responsible for providing deposit accounts and processing checks 
remained safe and sound.3 The government has developed a repertoire of regu-
latory and emergency measures (known as “prudential regulation”) over the 
decades to shore up confidence in banks, reduce the risk of runs, and ensure 
that payments can continue to be made.4 Such measures have been reasonably 
successful in preserving the payments system—even during the financial crisis 
of 2007–2008, retail payments were not interrupted. The retail payments land-
scape is becoming increasingly technologically complex, however, with the 
entry of new fintech firms into the market.5 These fintech firms are not typical-
ly chartered as banks, and thus avoid most prudential regulation. Furthermore, 
prudential regulation—which focuses on addressing credit and liquidity risks 
that may impact institutional solvency—does not fully contemplate or address 
                                                                                                                           
 1 Enhanced Cyber Risk Management Standards, 81 Fed. Reg. 74,315 (proposed Oct. 26, 2016); 
THOMAS M. EISENBACH ET AL., FED. RSRV. BANK OF N.Y., CYBER RISK AND THE U.S. FINANCIAL 
SYSTEM: A PRE-MORTEM ANALYSIS 1 (2020), https://www.newyorkfed.org/medialibrary/media/
research/staff_reports/sr909.pdf [https://perma.cc/K3ZC-F26F]. 
 2 Andrei A. Kirilenko & Andrew W. Lo, Moore’s Law Versus Murphy’s Law: Algorithmic Trad-
ing and Its Discontents, 27 J. ECON. PERSPS. 51, 52 (2013). 
 3 See FED. RSRV., FEDERAL RESERVE POLICY ON PAYMENT SYSTEM RISK 3 (effective Oct. 1, 
2020), https://www.federalreserve.gov/paymentsystems/files/psr_policy.pdf [https://perma.cc/DFY3-
9AXJ] [hereinafter FEDERAL RESERVE POLICY] (stating in its policy on payments system risk that 
“[t]he safety and efficiency of these systems may affect the safety and soundness of U.S. financial 
institutions and, in many cases, are vital to the financial stability of the United States”). 
 4 See RICHARD SCOTT CARNELL ET AL., THE LAW OF FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS 119 (6th ed. 
2017) (explaining that courts and regulators know that banks pose particular hazards to the economy, 
and therefore warrant specific regulation). 
 5 See infra notes 172–291 and accompanying text. 
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the possibility of a crisis driven primarily by operational risks.6 As a result, even 
the banks involved in processing retail payments are inadequately regulated. 
An analogy to the prudential regulatory strategies adopted before the last 
crisis illustrates the inadequacy of our current approach to regulating opera-
tional risk. Pre-crisis prudential regulation largely was predicated on the as-
sumption that so long as individual banks were safe and sound, the system as a 
whole also would be robust.7 However, steps that individual banks took to pre-
serve their own solvency—most notably, selling assets at “fire sale” prices—
created problems for entire asset markets (and the institutions that participated 
in them), which made the financial system as a whole much weaker.8 It is simi-
larly possible that leaving operational risk management to individual payments 
providers will make the retail payments system more fragile, if the steps taken 
internally to manage operational risk have consequences for other payments 
providers.9 This Article is the first to argue for “macro-operational” regulation, 
designed to deal with a potential new breed of financial crises that could arise 
from systemic interactions of technological operational risks. 
Such crises would have more in common with the failure of complex in-
frastructure systems, such as power grids, than with the financial crises of the 
past. This Article therefore argues that complexity science, particularly the lit-
erature on cascade failures, provides an important framework for assessing 
fragilities in the retail payments system. This literature identifies five different 
dimensions of robustness in complex systems: reliability, efficiency, modulari-
ty, scalability, and evolvability.10 Of these dimensions, improved modularity, 
scalability, and evolvability are most likely to protect the system from cascad-
ing failures.11 Somewhat counterintuitively, focusing too heavily on improving 
the reliability of the individual components of the system can render it more 
susceptible to catastrophic failure—a state that complexity science refers to as 
“robust yet fragile.”12 Unfortunately, however, existing regulation of opera-
                                                                                                                           
 6 See infra notes 33–49 and accompanying text. 
 7 Luca Enriques et al., Network-Sensitive Financial Regulation, 45 J. CORP. L. 351, 357 (2020). 
 8 See Markus K. Brunnermeier, Deciphering the Liquidity and Credit Crunch 2007–2008, 23 J. 
ECON. PERSPS. 77, 94 (2009) (describing “fire-sale externalit[ies],” as occurring when “[e]ach indi-
vidual speculator takes future prices as given and hence does not take into account that unloading 
assets will cause some adverse effects on other speculators by forcing them to sell their positions as 
well”). 
 9 See infra notes 89–127 and accompanying text. 
 10 J.B. Ruhl, Managing Systemic Risk in Legal Systems, 89 IND. L.J. 559, 570 (2014) (citing Da-
vid L. Alderson & John C. Doyle, Contrasting Views of Complexity and Their Implications for Net-
work-Centric Infrastructures, 40 IEEE TRANSACTIONS ON SYS., MAN, & CYBERNETICS 839, 840 
(2010)). Part I.B elaborates on these dimensions in more detail. See infra notes 50–88 and accompa-
nying text. 
 11 Ruhl, supra note 10, at 594. 
 12 Id. at 562. 
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tional payments risk focuses primarily on encouraging banks to minimize their 
own operational risks—in other words, the focus is squarely on the reliability 
of some of the system’s component parts. Regulators have done little to pro-
mote the modularity, scalability, and evolvability of the system as a whole. 
Macro-operational regulation could begin to improve these dimensions of the 
retail payments ecosystem. 
Admittedly, complexity science is reasonably pessimistic about our abil-
ity to contain the failures of complex systems, and we should not expect mac-
ro-operational regulation to entirely eliminate the possibility of cascading op-
erational failures.13 That does not mean that regulation is a wasted effort, how-
ever: well-designed regulation can render the retail payments ecosystem more 
robust to such failures.14 Furthermore, well-designed regulation can establish, 
in advance, emergency measures that regulators and payments providers can 
take to mitigate damage once a cascade failure begins. Of course, what consti-
tutes “well-designed regulation” always will be somewhat subjective and un-
certain in the context of the highly complex retail payments ecosystem. In my 
previous work, I have argued strenuously that when it comes to financial sta-
bility, policymakers should take a precautionary approach, erring on the side of 
caution when dealing with uncertainty—even at some cost to efficiency.15 Re-
tail payments processing is both critical to economic functioning and facilitated 
by a complex system that is robust yet fragile.16 Accordingly, this Article argues 
that policymakers should view the system as critical infrastructure that deserves 
prospective regulation because of the potential for catastrophic failures. 
It is already well recognized that the existing payments infrastructure in 
the United States is antiquated and in dire need of improvement.17 New fintech 
                                                                                                                           
13 See CHARLES PERROW, NORMAL ACCIDENTS: LIVING WITH HIGH-RISK TECHNOLOGIES 5 (2d 
ed. 1999) (pointing out that new methods of regulation not only fail to prevent accidents in complex 
systems, but can sometimes make certain kinds of accidents more likely to occur); Alderson & Doyle, 
supra note 10, at 839 (noting that traditionally we have failed to successfully address “the fragilities 
created by our complex networks, from global warming to ecosystem destruction, global financial 
crises”). 
14 See Ruhl, supra note 10, at 564–65 (explaining that although efforts to increase systemic ro-
bustness might actually increase complexity and thus the chance that the system will fail, “the balance 
between robustness and fragility is something we can hope to influence”). 
15 Hilary J. Allen, A New Philosophy for Financial Stability Regulation, 45 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 173, 
178 (2013). 
 16 See generally Morgan Ricks, Money as Infrastructure, 2018 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 757 
(providing an excellent discussion of the financial system as public infrastructure). 
 17 In 2014, the New York Superintendent of Financial Services lambasted the financial industry 
for the state of payments systems: “At a certain point, enough is enough . . . . Four decades of slow-to-
non-existent progress in the bank payments system seem like fair warning.” Ian McKendry, Lawsky to 
Banks: Speed Up Payments Innovation—Or Else, AM. BANKER (Dec. 18, 2014), https://www.
americanbanker.com/news/lawsky-to-banks-speed-up-payments-innovation-or-else [https://perma.
cc/47UJ-Q29Z]. 
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technologies are being hailed by many as the solution, but it is an open ques-
tion whether these technologies will make our financial system more robust—
both in the prudential sense and from the macro-operational risk perspective 
articulated in this Article. This Article briefly will explore the vulnerabilities of 
several new fintech payments technologies to runs, before assessing these 
technologies from the perspectives of modularity, scalability, and evolvability. 
The surveyed payments innovations that rely on the “new rails” of dis-
tributed ledger technology do have the potential to increase modularity within 
the retail payments ecosystem, as they aspire to create an alternative path for 
processing payments that can function even if the “old rails” are compromised. 
These innovations do not assure modularity, however. Even if payments inno-
vations initially promote systemic modularity, the retail payments system may 
ultimately lose this modularity through efficiency-driven innovations in in-
teroperability that link the new rails to the old rails—and to other new rails.18 
The modularity of the retail payments system also will be reduced if a new 
payments provider outcompetes its rivals to establish a monopoly on retail 
payments processing. Then there will be no alternative path. Uncertainties re-
garding the governance structure of many of the distributed ledgers also sug-
gest concerns about how the technology will be able to scale and evolve—a 
static ledger ultimately may become overwhelmed as usage patterns change 
over time. 
Because new fintech technologies are not a silver bullet for creating a ro-
bust retail payments ecosystem, regulators, central bankers, and legislators 
need to consider the types of regulatory strategies that they themselves might 
deploy to reduce the risk of crises driven by operational failures, or to respond 
to them once they have occurred. This Article offers the very beginnings of a 
discussion on strategies that regulators could adopt to reduce the fragility of 
the retail payments system. The intention of this Article is to inspire a debate 
on these issues, rather than to provide concrete and comprehensive macro-
operational policies. Even at this early stage, however, it is clear that the exper-
tise of complexity and data scientists will be critical to macro-operational regu-
lation, and regulators should prioritize hiring persons with such expertise. 
The Article proceeds as follows. Part I introduces the extant prudential 
approach to financial stability regulation, before offering an alternative com-
plexity perspective that is more apt when considering the possibility of finan-
cial crises caused by operational failures.19 Part II then analyzes existing pay-
                                                                                                                           
18 See David Mills et al., Distributed Ledger Technology in Payments, Clearing, and Settlement 
23 (Fed. Rsrv. Bd., Working Paper No. 2016-095, 2016), https://www.federalreserve.gov/econresdata/
feds/2016/files/2016095pap.pdf [https://perma.cc/34E7-5F2S] (discussing why interoperability is 
considered an important goal for new payments innovations by many in the financial industry). 
 19 See infra notes 29–127 and accompanying text. 
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ments regulation from a complexity perspective, and finds it wanting in terms of 
its ability to make the retail payments ecosystem as a whole more robust to fail-
ure.20 Part III considers a sample of recent payments innovations to assess their 
potential to improve or threaten the robustness of the retail payments ecosystem, 
and (because the credit-related risks associated with these new technologies are 
undertheorized) considers whether they pose prudential concerns as well.21 Part 
IV makes some initial policy recommendations, drawn from complexity theory, 
that could function as the beginnings of a macro-operational regulatory frame-
work.22 
Before proceeding any further, it is helpful to have a brief introduction to 
the basics of payments processing and some of the terminology used in this 
Article. Non-cash payments are essentially accounting transactions, debiting 
the payer’s account and crediting the payee’s account.23 Payments processing 
requires a system that can accept requests to initiate these transactions, validate 
them, and then—if the request is found to be valid—check whether specified 
conditions precedent, such as the availability of funds, have been met.24 Only 
after these processes have been completed can the payment be settled by cred-
iting the payee’s account.25 Confusingly, the term “payments system” can refer 
to both a discrete system for processing payments offered by a single provider 
and to the overarching national, and sometimes international, architecture for 
payments processing.26 Some payments systems exist to process wholesale 
payments, where the users are typically financial institutions, large commercial 
firms, or other firms providing payment services.27 This Article, however, fo-
cuses on the systems that facilitate retail payments—the types of payments 
made by consumers and businesses in daily commerce.28 To avoid confusion—
                                                                                                                           
 20 See infra notes 128–171 and accompanying text. 
 21 See infra notes 172–291 and accompanying text. 
 22 See infra notes 292–348 and accompanying text. 
 23 CARNELL ET AL., supra note 4, at 72. 
 24 Mills et al., supra note 18, at 5. 
 25 Id. 
 26 See id. at 5, 9 (noting that transfers of funds between parties often are carried out by payments 
systems and that “a set of large and complex electronic networks of participants and processes . . . 
comprise the financial architecture and are often broadly called the U.S. payment system”). 
 27 Dan Awrey & Kristin van Zwieten, The Shadow Payment System, 43 J. CORP. L. 775, 781–82 
(2018). 
 28 To supply a definition, “[r]etail payments usually involve transactions between two consumers, 
between consumers and businesses, or between two businesses.” Retail Payment Systems Overview, 
FED. FIN. INSTS. EXAMINATION COUNCIL (FFIEC) IT EXAMINATION HANDBOOK INFOBASE, https://it
handbook.ffiec.gov/it-booklets/retail-payment-systems/retail-payment-systems-overview.aspx [https://
perma.cc/W9GD-CCZZ]. They often are contrasted with “[w]holesale payments [that] are typically 
made between businesses.” Id. Furthermore, “[a]lthough there is no definitive division between retail 
and wholesale payments, retail payment systems generally have higher transaction volumes and lower 
average dollar values than wholesale payment systems.” Id. 
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and using lexicon inspired by the complexity science literature—this Article 
will refer to the overarching architecture for retail payments processing as the 
“retail payments ecosystem.” This Article will use the term “payments provid-
er” to refer to individual participants in that ecosystem. 
I. PERSPECTIVES ON FINANCIAL SYSTEM FAILURE 
Past experience suggests that the broader economy will suffer if there is a 
significant disruption in the credit that ordinarily is extended by and to finan-
cial institutions.29 The regulatory apparatus that has been adopted to promote 
financial stability is largely informed by a desire to avoid the disruption of 
such credit channels.30 If we become too beholden, however, to this narrative 
of crises as being transmitted through credit channels, we may miss other im-
portant ways in which the stability of our financial system, and the health of 
our broader economy, may become compromised. The primary goal of finan-
cial regulation should be to avoid any systemic failure that harms broader eco-
nomic growth—regardless of how the system fails.31 This Part demonstrates 
that future financial crises could be driven primarily by operational failures, 
and focuses specifically on vulnerabilities that may originate in, and be com-
municated by, the retail payments ecosystem. Crisis prevention discussions, 
however, often neglect operational risk, perhaps because there is little prece-
dent for such crises in our historical narrative.32 
A. The Credit-Channel Perspective 
In their seminal history of financial crises, Reinhart and Rogoff observed 
that most of the financial crises that have occurred in modern developed econ-
omies have started out as banking panics.33 These banking panics then metas-
                                                                                                                           
 29 See BEN BERNANKE, BROOKINGS INST., THE REAL EFFECTS OF DISRUPTED CREDIT: EVI-
DENCE FROM THE GLOBAL FINANCIAL CRISIS 3 (2018), https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/
uploads/2018/09/BPEA_Fall2018_The-real-effects-of-the-financial-crisis.pdf [https://perma.cc/EU5J-
ST3D] (explaining that the weaknesses in the financial system prior to the last financial crisis resulted 
in credit disruptions and widespread panic). 
 30 Id. at 6. 
 31 Hilary J. Allen, Putting the “Financial Stability” in Financial Stability Oversight Council, 76 
OHIO ST. L.J. 1087, 1093 (2015). 
 32 One welcomed exception is a recent Staff Report from the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, 
which seeks to integrate the literature on a particular type of operational risk (cyber risk) into the liter-
ature on bank runs, and conduct a “pre-mortem” of what wholesale payments failure might look like. 
See EISENBACH ET AL., supra note 1, at 1 (beginning their discussion by noting that “[i]n some ways, 
losses related to cyber attacks are similar to other operational loss events that can trigger liquidity runs 
and lead to solvency issues”). 
 33 CARMEN M. REINHART & KENNETH S. ROGOFF, THIS TIME IS DIFFERENT: EIGHT CENTURIES 
OF FINANCIAL FOLLY 141, 146 (2011). 
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tasized into financial system failures that had macroeconomic repercussions 
once the compromised financial system was unable to provide credit to the 
broader economy.34 The classic formulation of a banking panic is as a series of 
bank runs, pithily described by Diamond and Dybvig as follows: 
During a bank run, depositors rush to withdraw their deposits be-
cause they expect the bank to fail. In fact, the sudden withdrawals 
can force the bank to liquidate many of its assets at a loss and to fail. 
In a panic with many bank failures, there is a disruption of the mon-
etary system and a reduction in production.35 
In other words, banking panics occur when depositors refuse to continue to 
provide credit (their deposits are in fact loans to banks), with the result that the 
banks themselves are unable to provide the credit (including mortgages and 
business loans) that is necessary to fuel economic growth. 
This run dynamic also was central to sparking the 2007–2008 financial 
crisis, although it manifested in a more sophisticated way. Instead of a run 
caused by depositors refusing to extend credit to banks, the crisis involved “a 
run on the sale and repurchase market (the repo market), which is a very large, 
short-term market that provides financing for a wide range of securitization 
activities and financial institutions.”36 Once financial institutions were unable 
to use the repo market to access what was functionally credit, they were, as in 
a classic bank run, forced to liquidate many of their assets at a loss. These 
crippled institutions were no longer able to provide credit to businesses, and 
the institutions that did have funding often lacked the confidence to lend. As a 
result, expansion and growth were limited.37 
In a recent influential paper, former Federal Reserve Chair Ben Bernanke 
reiterated the importance of credit channels in both generating and transmitting 
crises.38 A credit-driven crisis certainly could impact the ability of the retail 
                                                                                                                           
34 Id. at 141, 146–47. 
 35 Douglas W. Diamond & Philip H. Dybvig, Bank Runs, Deposit Insurance, and Liquidity, 91 J. 
POL. ECON. 401, 401 (1983). 
 36 Gary Gorton & Andrew Metrick, Securitized Banking and the Run on Repo, 104 J. FIN. ECON. 
425, 425 (2012). 
 37 See Brunnermeier, supra note 8, at 90 (explaining that in the midst of the financial crisis, fi-
nancial institutions took measures to protect themselves against the failings of other banks, and credit 
markets tightened overall). 
 38 BERNANKE, supra note 29, at 5. Bernanke concludes: 
[R]ecent experience and research highlight the need for greater attention to credit-
related factors in modeling and forecasting the economy. Standard models used by cen-
tral banks and other policymakers . . . do not easily accommodate financial stresses of 
the sort seen in 2007-2009, including the evident disruption of credit markets. 
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payments ecosystem to function, and regulation that seeks to avoid such crises 
has been implemented in part to ensure the continuing availability of bank-
based payments systems.39 There also is credit risk embedded in many tradi-
tional forms of retail payment, such as checks and credit cards, where the 
payment could take several days to ultimately settle, leaving at least one party 
to the transaction exposed to default.40 Many newer payment methods, howev-
er, are being provided by non-banks, aim for real-time settlement, and are thus 
less reliant on credit and more reliant on technological innovation for their op-
eration.41 With many of these new payment services, the intermediary is not 
compensated for taking on the credit risks associated with settlement (or at 
least, much less of the compensation relates to that risk).42 Instead, users pay 
fees for the efficiency and convenience associated with the mechanical pro-
cessing of payments.43 But even as some of the credit-related vulnerabilities in 
the retail payments ecosystem are being addressed, new operational risks are 
being introduced. 
Payments systems have become vulnerable to mass technological failures 
in recent decades as reliance on electronic processing and communication has 
increased.44 Such vulnerability will only be exacerbated by the increasing 
speed and complexity of new innovations in payments processing.45 Because 
of the relative novelty of these operational risks, it is not surprising that there is 
no historical precedent for a full-blown crisis generated by operational failures 
                                                                                                                           
Id. Bernanke’s seminal work on the banking panics that led to the Great Depression informed the 
Federal Reserve’s response to the 2007–2008 crisis. REINHART & ROGOFF, supra note 33, at 146–47. 
 39 Awrey & van Zwieten, supra note 27, at 794, 796. Lacker observes that although the United 
States has experienced events that impacted the functioning of the interbank payments system, none 
yet have had a significant detrimental impact on retail payments processing. Jeffrey M. Lacker, Pay-
ment System Disruptions and the Federal Reserve Following September 11, 2001, at 24 (Fed. Rsrv. 
Bank of Richmond, Working Paper No. 03-16, 2003), https://www.richmondfed.org/~/media/
richmondfedorg/publications/research/working_papers/2003/pdf/wp03-16.pdf [https://perma.cc/HPM2-
BC42] (noting that in all the past crises, “bank runs either did not occur or were secondary; the main 
event in all was the interbank payment system”). 
40 Ross P. Buckley & Ignacio Mas, The Coming of Age of Digital Payments as a Field of Exper-
tise, 2016 U. ILL. J.L. TECH. & POL’Y 71, 76. 
41 Id. at 72. 
 42 Id. at 73. Or at least, much less of the intermediary’s compensation relates to that risk. Id. 
43 Id. 
44 Lacker, supra note 39, at 25. 
45 J.B. Ruhl, Governing Cascade Failures in Complex Social-Ecological-Technological Systems: 
Framing Context, Strategies, and Challenges, 22 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 407, 410 (2020); see 
Kirilenko & Lo, supra note 2, at 52 (explaining that although there are many benefits of “computer-
based automation,” it has drawbacks because the financial industry increasingly will use such technol-
ogy and the “regulatory framework that is supposed to oversee such technological and financial inno-
vations” is insufficient). 
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in the retail payments system.46 A failure of the infrastructure supporting retail 
payments processing could certainly be systemic, however, and could be at 
least as debilitating as a financial crisis transmitted through credit channels.47 
The retail payments system performs functions that are key to consummating 
everyday transactions—it stores and keeps funds safe for customers and it al-
lows for those funds to be transferred to provide consideration for transac-
tions.48 If a widespread failure of retail payments infrastructure were to com-
promise the storage and/or transfer of funds, that could be more immediately 
harmful than any systemic problem conveyed through the credit channels. 
Because there is a lack of historical precedent from which to draw lessons 
about how operational risks might trigger, or transmit, broader economic harm, 
we need a new framework within which to consider what may arise as our re-
tail payments infrastructure evolves. This new framework is vital from both an 
ex ante and an ex post perspective: our current narrative may blind us to exist-
ing vulnerabilities in the financial system, and also may prescribe unsuitable 
remedies if a payments failure does occur. Bernanke has noted that the emer-
gency measures adopted by governments in response to the financial crisis of 
2007–2008 did not differ significantly from those that Walter Bagehot would 
have recommended in the nineteenth century.49 Similar measures probably will 
continue to be appropriate as long as crises are primarily communicated by 
credit channels, but traditional methods of emergency support are likely to be 
of limited utility if the problem is an immediate cessation of the ability of mar-
ket participants to transact, rather than a drying up of credit. Financial stability 
regulation needs to be reconsidered in light of the possibility of crises precipi-
tated by, and transmitted through, operational failures. 
B. A Complexity Perspective 
To facilitate such exploration, this Section of the Article provides a new 
framework within which to consider the possibility of cascading technological 
failures. Adopting a new and complementary theoretical framework will force 
us to divorce ourselves from the theoretical path dependency that comes from 
                                                                                                                           
46 Lacker notes two instances—a Bank of New York software glitch in 1985 and September 11, 
2001—where there were technological problems that initiated problems in the interbank payments 
system. Lacker, supra note 39, at 24. Neither of these impacted the retail payments system, however, 
and to the extent that their impacts rippled through the wholesale banking system, it was as a result of 
credit channels. See id. (noting that runs only occurred as a result of the initial failures). 
47 See Kristin N. Johnson, Essay, Managing Cyber Risks, 50 GA. L. REV. 547, 553 (2016) (dis-
cussing a similar argument with respect to cyber attacks specifically). 
48 Dan Awrey & Kristin van Zwieten, Mapping the Shadow Payment System 7 (SWIFT Inst., 
Working Paper No. 2019-001, 2019), https://swiftinstitute.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/10/Mapping-
the-Shadow-Payment-System-vFINAL.pdf [https://perma.cc/H37J-8BU7]. 
 49 See BERNANKE, supra note 29, at 1. 
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following historical precedent too closely. Literature from the discipline of 
complexity science, which provides a more general understanding of complex 
adaptive systems through their features and failures, can help provide such a 
theoretical framework.50 
Complex adaptive systems are complex in the number and diversity of 
their components and complex in the interactions of their components, with the 
result that the behavior of the system as a whole is complex and not predicta-
ble from merely examining the components in isolation.51 These systems tend 
to be “robust yet fragile,” in the sense that steps taken to make the system 
more robust unwittingly create fragilities that only become evident when parts 
of the system interact in unanticipated ways.52 Such unexpected interactions 
can trigger failures with catastrophic consequences.53 These types of failures 
are often referred to as “cascade[] failures,” because they are transmitted by 
interconnections amongst the system components, and magnified through the 
transmission process.54 
Many prominent economists and legal scholars already have observed 
that the financial system exhibits the features of a complex adaptive system, 
and have turned to complexity science for its explanatory power in illuminat-
ing how the financial system functions.55 When scholars have applied the 
complexity science literature to the financial system, however, they have often 
done so retroactively, seeking to illuminate the dynamics of past crises, often 
with a particular focus on credit transmission channels.56 The related field of 
network theory has been used prospectively, primarily by economists, to gain 
some insight as to how systemic risks might propagate in networks of financial 
institutions and markets in the future, but this literature again is focused on 
                                                                                                                           
 50 See Ruhl, supra note 10, at 562 (discussing the application of complexity science to the realm 
of law and other social sciences). Notwithstanding that the discipline evolved from the hard sciences, 
complexity science also has proved to have many applications to social systems like economies. See 
id. 
 51 Id. at 567–68 (quoting Alderson & Doyle, supra note 10, at 840) (citing MELANIE MITCHELL, 
COMPLEXITY: A GUIDED TOUR 12–13 (2009)). 
 52 See id. at 562, 564–65 (“[T]he ‘robust yet fragile’ (RYF) dilemma . . . is an inherent quality of 
any complex adaptive system . . . .” (citing Alderson & Doyle, supra note 10, at 843)). 
53 Id. at 564–65. 
54 Dirk Helbing, Globally Networked Risks and How to Respond, 497 NATURE 51, 51 (2013). 
55 See Lawrence G. Baxter, Betting Big: Value, Caution and Accountability in an Era of Large 
Banks and Complex Finance, 31 REV. BANKING & FIN. L. 765, 861–68 (2012) (discussing the opera-
tional and regulatory complexity of financial markets). See generally Andrew G. Haldane & Robert 
M. May, Systemic Risk in Banking Ecosystems, 469 NATURE 351 (2011) (comparing the financial 
system and its evolution to that of complex ecosystems). 
56 See Baxter, supra note 55, at 866 (“The newly perceived importance of developing better 
methods for predicting potential system failures is one of the byproducts of the Financial Crisis.”); 
Haldane & May, supra note 55, at 353 (noting that one of the leading issues of the last financial crisis 
was the interruption of loans and credit channels between banks). 
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credit transmission channels.57 In contrast, this Article seeks to use the com-
plexity literature to explore potential vulnerabilities in our financial system 
that do not arise from the extension of credit. Because a future payments fail-
ure may resemble a blackout more than a bank run, this Article turns to the 
literature on cascading failures of complex systems like the electrical grid, to 
help assess threats that may emerge as our payments system evolves.58 The 
literature on complex systems also can inform the development of regulatory 
measures designed to make the payments ecosystem more robust to operation-
al risk, without exacerbating its fragility. 
As with any complex system, “[p]ower transmission systems are hetero-
geneous networks of large numbers of components that interact in diverse 
ways.”59 Components of power transmission systems can fail for a variety of 
reasons. They can be disconnected for safety reasons, for example, or damaged 
as a result of “aging, fire, weather, poor maintenance, or incorrect design or 
operating settings.”60 If a component fails for any of these (or other unantici-
pated) reasons, then power will be redistributed to other components of the 
system and “flows all over the network change.”61 Flows of power also can be 
altered by changes in the behavior of the human actors using the power (for 
example, increased use of air conditioners during a heatwave).62 These chang-
es cause the remaining components of the system to interact in new and unan-
ticipated ways, and the more loaded the remaining components are, the strong-
er their interactions are likely to be.63 If further component failures ensue as a 
result, the system will become more fragile and stressed, with the possibility of 
“the propagation of many rare or unanticipated failures in a cascade.”64 The 
events that trigger these cascade failures “can seem random and trivial in isola-
                                                                                                                           
 57 See Enriques et al., supra note 7, at 361 (“Network theory is . . . a well-developed and scientifi-
cally advanced conceptual framework to analyze contexts in which connections are relevant, [and] it 
provides a rigorous set of tools to identify, describe, and measure connections.” (citing SANJEEV 
GOYAL, CONNECTIONS: AN INTRODUCTION TO THE ECONOMICS OF NETWORKS 2 (2012))). See gen-
erally Paul Glasserman & H. Peyton Young, Contagion in Financial Networks, 54 J. ECON. LITERA-
TURE 779 (2016) (providing a review of this economic literature on network theory that emphasizes 
its focus on credit and leverage). 
58 See Ian Dobson et al., Complex Systems Analysis of Series of Blackouts: Cascading Failure, 
Critical Points, and Self-organization, 17 CHAOS 026103, 026103-1 (2007) (“Cascading failure is the 
usual mechanism by which failures propagate to cause large blackouts of electric power transmission 
systems.”). 
59 Id. at 026103-2. 
60 Id. 
61 Id. 
62 M. Rosas-Casals et al., Knowing Power Grids and Understanding Complexity Science, 11 
INT’L J. CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURES 4, 7 (2015). 
63 Dobson et al., supra note 58, at 026103-2. 
64 Id. 
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tion,” but “[o]nce the cascade starts . . . it can be virtually unstoppable.”65 One 
important insight from the complexity science literature is that even if a faulty 
component can be identified after a problem, it is incomplete to say that that 
component caused the problem. Rather, the faulty component served as the 
trigger, but the problem was in fact caused by the complexity of the system in 
which the component was embedded.66 
This concept of cascade failure has significant descriptive power not only 
for electrical grids, but for all kinds of complex systems. The next Section will 
therefore use this complexity framework as the basis for conjecture about how 
a cascading failure in the retail payments system might transpire.67 A complex-
ity science framework is not only descriptive, though; it also provides sugges-
tions for making a complex adaptive system less prone to catastrophic failures. 
In an excellent paper outlining systemic risks in legal systems, Professor 
J.B. Ruhl synthesizes the complexity science literature in a way that is accessi-
ble to legal scholars. To assist in determining how to design a system that is 
less susceptible to cascading failures and thus more likely to continue to dis-
charge its functions, Ruhl provides a taxonomy of five dimensions of robust-
ness: reliability, efficiency, scalability, modularity, and evolvability.68 Ruhl 
notes that it is usually not possible to maximize all five dimensions of robust-
ness; sacrifices in one dimension are sometimes needed to avoid a system that 
is robust yet fragile to certain shocks.69 
Sacrificing efficiency in the name of stability is reasonably intuitive, alt-
hough often politically challenging. The mechanisms that allow a financial 
system to move capital around more efficiently are equally as efficient in 
transmitting shocks.70 “Shortcuts” that allow for direct links between compo-
nents of a complex adaptive system are therefore likely to increase the risk of 
cascade failure within that system, whereas inhibiting the flow of any complex 
system slows down the transmission of problems from component to compo-
                                                                                                                           
65 Ruhl, supra note 45, at 410 (citing Raissa M. D’Souza, Curtailing Cascading Failures, 358 
SCI. 860, 861 (2017)). 
66 SAMUEL ARBESMAN, OVERCOMPLICATED: TECHNOLOGY AT THE LIMITS OF COMPREHENSION 
12 (2016). 
 67 See infra notes 89–127 and accompanying text. 
 68 Ruhl, supra note 10, at 564, 570 (quoting Alderson & Doyle, supra note 10, at 840). The 
framework provides: “Reliability involves robustness to component failures. Efficiency is robustness 
to resource scarcity. Scalability is robustness to changes to the size and complexity of the system as a 
whole. Modularity is robustness to structured component rearrangements. Evolvability is robustness of 
lineages to changes on long time scales.” Alderson & Doyle, supra note 10, at 840. 
 69 Ruhl, supra note 10, at 575–76. Ruhl cites the work of complexity scientists Alderson and 
Doyle, who have concluded that if the priority is the reduction of risk of systemic failure, then scala-
bility, modularity, and evolvability should be prioritized over efficiency and reliability. Id. at 594 
(citing Alderson & Doyle, supra note 10, at 841). 
 70 Baxter, supra note 55, at 858. 
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nent.71 Sacrificing reliability in order to prevent systemic risk is a little more 
counterintuitive, but it stems from the same idea. Incremental steps that are 
taken to make individual components of a system more reliable in the face of 
known problems reduce the risk of those problems, but by ensuring that those 
components will continue to function, and by increasing the complexity of the 
system as a whole, those incremental steps can combine to facilitate the trans-
mission of unanticipated large problems.72 This does not mean that systems 
designers and policy-makers should seek to maximize inefficiency and unrelia-
bility—this would pyrrhically reduce systemic risk by creating a system that 
fails to work even in normal times. The key is to find balance with the dimen-
sions of robustness that are more likely to promote the stability of the system as 
a whole—which may require “investing in some inefficiency and sloppiness.”73 
Scalability, modularity, and evolvability are all dimensions of robustness 
that relate to the system’s ability to continue functioning well amidst changes. 
In the case of scalability, the relevant changes are to size and complexity. The 
modularity of a system refers to its ability to cope with changes to the organi-
zation of the system’s components: “[m]odularity promotes system robustness 
by allowing systems to work in parallel and to reconfigure, either in response 
to a component failure or as an adaptive move, without crashing the system.”74 
Evolvability is particularly important in the context of an adaptive complex sys-
tem, because it denotes an ability to adapt as the system changes over time.75 It 
is often impossible to predict how a system will be used in the future, but a 
system that is robust from an evolvability perspective can withstand many un-
anticipated changes in usage. This concept of evolvability is particularly im-
portant in the context of a highly regulated system, where the industry is likely 
to change its behavior in response to regulations. Such behavioral changes 
                                                                                                                           
 71 Ruhl, supra note 45, at 417, 419 (quoting Amir Bashan et al., The Extreme Vulnerability of 
Interdependent Spatially Embedded Networks, 9 NATURE PHYSICS 667, 667 (2013)) (citing Alderson 
& Doyle, supra note 10, at 843); see also Dobson et al., supra note 58, at 026103-11 (explaining that 
there is a point of “critical loading at which the probability of cascading failure sharply increases”). 
 72 See Ruhl, supra note 10, at 564–65 (discussing how “[o]ver time, as each local failure is met 
with new fail-safe strategies, system architecture grows more complex, and systemic risk becomes 
embedded in the system”). In the context of power transmission systems, Dobson et al. have observed 
that “measures to reduce the frequency of small blackouts can eventually reposition the system to 
have an increased risk of large blackouts.” Dobson et al., supra note 58, at 026103-10. Dobson et al. 
further remark that “[t]he possibility of an overall adverse effect on risk from apparently sensible 
mitigation efforts shows the importance of accounting for complex system dynamics when devising 
mitigation schemes.” Id. (citing B.A. CARRERAS ET AL., HAW. INT’L CONF. ON SYS. SCI., BLACKOUT 
MITIGATION ASSESSMENT IN POWER TRANSMISSION SYSTEMS (2003), http://iandobson.ece.iastate.
edu/PAPERS/carrerasHICSS03.pdf [https://perma.cc/JD7S-7VSZ]). 
 73 Ruhl, supra note 10, at 594. 
 74 Id. at 573. 
 75 Id. at 574. 
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subsequently inspire new regulations and more behavioral responses, resulting 
in a continually changing system.76 
There are a number of measures that can be adopted to promote these 
types of robustness. According to the complexity scientists, “redundancy, sen-
sors, and feedback” mechanisms are the measures on which regulators seeking 
to avoid catastrophic failures should focus.77 Redundancy is a relatively famil-
iar concept, with “redundancy in components and system subparts, although 
not always contributing to efficiency . . . [being] a well-studied and common 
strategy in systems application.”78 Redundancy may promote modularity, but it 
will not necessarily create the scalability and evolvability that are desirable in 
any complex adaptive system.79 Sensors built into the system can detect inter-
nal and external changes that may pose threats to the continued functioning of 
the system, and feedback protocols can act on the input of those sensors, al-
lowing the system to grow and evolve.80 Ensuring the quality of the compo-
nents of the system themselves is also a relevant fail-safe strategy, but this con-
tributes primarily to the reliability of the system, rather than its scalability, 
modularity, or evolvability. Thus, if our primary concern is with systemic risk, 
component quality should not be the only fail-safe mechanism.81 As Ruhl 
summarizes, “The core idea is to avoid constructing a rigid, highly integrated 
network of ultraquality, homogenous components with few sensors and cen-
tralized system actuators.”82 
It is important to note that incorporating redundancy, sensors, and feed-
back protocols will reduce, but not eliminate, the risk of cascade failures with-
in the system.83 The term “normal accident” was most famously formulated by 
Charles Perrow, and he uses it to describe accidents that are produced by cas-
cade failures facilitated by the “interactive complexity and tight coupling” of 
highly complex systems.84 He uses the word “normal” to convey his view that 
                                                                                                                           
 76 Lawrence G. Baxter, Adaptive Financial Regulation and RegTech: A Concept Article on Real-
istic Protection for Victims of Bank Failures, 66 DUKE L.J. 567, 594 (2016). 
 77 Ruhl, supra note 10, at 594. 
 78 Id. at 580. 
79 See id. at 581 (“Ultraquality and redundancy techniques ‘can be effective at providing robust-
ness in the face of component uncertainty, but they do not help achieve robustness to the external 
environment.’” (quoting Alderson & Doyle, supra note 10, at 841)). 
 80 Id. 
81 See id. at 579 (“One obvious approach for managing component-level constraints on system 
robustness is to improve the quality of the system components so they rarely fail.”). Cost and techno-
logical limitations also may place finite limitations on the level of quality that can be achieved. 
82 Id. at 594. 
83 See id. at 584 (discussing how fail-safe mechanisms such as “components, sensors, redundan-
cies, feedback mechanisms, and actuator protocols” increase both the robustness and the complexity 
of the system). 
84 PERROW, supra note 13, at 5. 
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such accidents are a fundamental, perhaps unavoidable, feature of such highly 
complex systems.85 Systems will always remain vulnerable to unanticipated 
risks, because sensors may not look for these, and feedback protocols will give 
no guidance as to how to react.86 Furthermore, once risks are anticipated, the 
inclusion of any sensors and feedback protocols to address them will further 
complexify the system, potentially generating the conditions for different kinds 
of cascade failures.87 That does not mean that measures to increase robustness 
are always futile, though. As Ruhl notes, “[S]ome degree of systemic risk is 
inherent in any complex adaptive system—but the balance between robustness 
and fragility is something we can hope to influence.”88 
C. Cascading Retail Payments Failure 
Retail payment services are provided to customers by a heterogeneous 
global network of central banks, banks and clearinghouses, and, increasingly, 
non-banks providing payment services.89 These institutions and firms are 
themselves composites of software, hardware, and humans: the retail payments 
ecosystem therefore can be characterized as a system of systems, with the in-
dividual components interacting with each other and with customers in diverse 
ways. These interactions will continue to evolve as consumer usage patterns 
change and retail payments providers enter and exit the market—and such in-
teractions are not overseen or coordinated by any overarching centralized con-
trol. The retail payments ecosystem thus qualifies as a complex adaptive sys-
tem and is susceptible to cascade failures.90 
It is difficult to provide a prospective description of what a cascade of op-
erational failures in the retail payments ecosystem might look like. There are 
certainly no historical examples that provide any insight into how our modern 
retail payments ecosystem might fail. The so-called “back office” crisis that 
disabled the stock markets in the late 1960s was caused by paper backlogs ra-
ther than the interactions of complex technologies, and although it resulted in 
the insolvency of many broker-dealers, it impacted only those who trade 
                                                                                                                           
85 Id. 
86 See Ruhl, supra note 10, at 587 (noting that one reason fail-safe mechanisms cannot eliminate 
systemic failure entirely is that mechanisms designed to ward off known dangers might be at risk of 
failure from unknown dangers). 
87 Id. at 588 (citing Alderson & Doyle, supra note 10, at 842). 
 88 Id. at 565. 
 89 Regarding new non-bank payment services, see infra notes 172–291 and accompanying text. 
 90 One definition of “complex adaptive systems” is: “large networks of components with no cen-
tral control and simple rules of operation give rise to complex collective behavior, sophisticated in-
formation processing, and adaptation via learning or evolution.” MITCHELL, supra note 51, at 13. 
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stocks91—a much smaller subset of the population than those who need to 
make and receive retail payments. Following the 9/11 terrorist attacks, there 
were some problems with processing wholesale payments amongst financial 
institutions, but retail payments were not compromised to any significant ex-
tent.92 The week-long “bank holiday” declared by President Roosevelt in 1933 
was “a complete stoppage of the entire U.S. payments system,” but a voluntary 
suspension of retail payments in the 1930s tells us nothing about how pay-
ments technology might inadvertently fail in 2021.93 The 1933 bank holiday 
also reveals little about the economic cost of a frozen retail payments system: 
given the economic turmoil of the Great Depression, it is hard to parse the pre-
cise economic cost of this suspension of payments processing. In fact, many 
have argued that the bank holiday actually improved the economic situation by 
reestablishing the credibility of retail payments processing.94 
When attempting to divine the potential economic cost of a modern-day 
payments outage, a helpful, though imperfect, analogy can be drawn with the 
outages experienced by the mobile money platform M-Pesa in Kenya. Alt-
hough this Article is focused on retail payments processing in advanced econ-
omies—and thus does not consider the operational risks associated with the 
mobile money platforms that have been extremely successful in developing 
economies—Kenyan citizens’ widespread use of M-Pesa illustrates the poten-
tial for technological problems with a payments systems to compromise a na-
tion’s economy. For example, M-Pesa experienced a significant outage in De-
cember 2018 and then again in May 2019—both of these lasted approximately 
two hours and were attributed to a “database problem.”95 A prior outage also 
had occurred in 2017, when, for unexplained reasons, “the operator had lost 
connectivity in its core network and the redundant path.”96 Even these relative-
ly short outages had noticeable economic consequences,97 and the Kenyan 
                                                                                                                           
 91 For a discussion regarding the paper logs and broker-dealer failures that caused the back office 
crisis, see Walter Werner, The SEC as a Market Regulator, 70 VA. L. REV. 755, 770 (1984); Wyatt 
Wells, The Remaking of Wall Street, 1967 to 1971, HARV. BUS. SCH. (Oct. 2, 2000), https://hbswk.
hbs.edu/archive/the-remaking-of-wall-street-1967-to-1971 [https://perma.cc/9KGP-F2RG] (discussing 
the Wall Street crisis in the late 1960s as one that occurred in the “back offices” of financial firms). 
 92 Lacker, supra note 39, at 7, 24. 
 93 WILLIAM L. SILBER, FED. RSRV. BANK OF N.Y., WHY DID FDR’S BANK HOLIDAY SUCCEED?  
21 (2009), https://www.newyorkfed.org/medialibrary/media/research/epr/09v15n1/0907silb.pdf [https://
perma.cc/GZL3-4LZD]. 
 94 Id. at 19. 
 95 Njenga Hakeenah, Countrywide M-Pesa Outage Hits Safaricom, Kenyans Again, THE EX-
CHANGE (May 17, 2019), https://theexchange.africa/countries/kenya/m-pesa-outage-countrywide-
safaricom-bills-shopping-sanctions/ [https://perma.cc/DP5D-XX9R]. 
 96 Id. Furthermore, the Chief Executive of Safaricom, the company behind M-Pesa, released a 
statement saying that “This shouldn’t happen. It is unusual that both failed.” Id. 
 97 Id. 
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Treasury Department has since recognized that if M-Pesa were to be compro-
mised for a more prolonged period of time, the Kenyan government’s tax reve-
nues ultimately would be impacted. The Kenyan Treasury Department there-
fore has designated the possibility of a “technological disaster” as a “plausible 
fiscal risk.”98 
This Article argues that policy-makers dealing with more developed fi-
nancial systems also should consider the economic costs of operational failures 
in the retail payments ecosystem, although two commenters on the payments 
industry recently downplayed such concerns. Buckley and Mas hypothesized 
that “[w]hile it may prove highly inconvenient to many people, it is difficult to 
imagine the failure of a payments provider causing financial market contagion 
in the manner that the collapse of Lehman Brothers did.”99 This observation, 
however, seems predicated on the assumption that, in the absence of credit 
channels linking payments providers, there are no mechanisms for contagion to 
spread amongst them. Alternative contagion channels may exist, though.100 
In their “pre-mortem” of cyber risks to the stability of the wholesale pay-
ments system, Eisenbach et al. have focused on events that could compromise 
the availability of data or systems, and events that could compromise the integ-
rity of data.101 The functioning of the retail payments ecosystem could be simi-
larly compromised by disruptions to the availability and integrity of its data 
and systems. Such disruptions could be the result of a cyber attack, but they 
also could arise from other operational problems. For example, different pay-
ments providers might rely on shared infrastructure, such as cloud data storage, 
and thus be equally compromised by a problem with that infrastructure that 
prevents them from, say, identifying whether a particular payer has sufficient 
funds to satisfy a request for a payment.102 Or a payments provider might suc-
cumb to a software bug that prevents it from transmitting payment instructions 
from payer to payee. That provider might try to route their customers’ payment 
orders to a second payments provider while the bug is being fixed, but the sec-
ond provider may be suffering the same problem simultaneously (financial 
                                                                                                                           
 98 See NAT’L TREASURY, REPUBLIC OF KENYA, 2017 BUDGET POLICY STATEMENT: CONSOLI-
DATING ECONOMIC GAINS IN AN ENVIRONMENT OF SUBDUED GLOBAL DEMAND 83 (2016), http://
treasury.go.ke/component/jdownloads/send/172-budget-policy-statement/459-2017-budget-policy-
statement.html (last visited Nov. 17, 2020) (noting that the economic risk comes from “mobile money 
transfer services” in particular). 
 99 Buckley & Mas, supra note 40, at 87. 
 100 See EISENBACH ET AL., supra note 1, at 1 (“Technological linkages through which cyber at-
tacks can spread are likely to be different from solvency and linkages arising from business interac-
tions.”). 
 101 Id. at 5. 
 102 See id. at 31 (“Vulnerabilities arising from third-party service providers is viewed as a promi-
nent sources of cyber risk especially when a provider is common to many institutions.”). 
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services providers are increasingly sourcing their technology from the same 
third-party vendors, so such an outcome is becoming increasingly likely).103 Or 
the second provider might have been functioning well initially, but its systems 
could buckle under the increased load of payment instructions it receives as a 
result of the first provider’s technological problem.104 Experience with power 
grids suggests that stressed alternative infrastructure will be more vulnerable to 
its own failure—it is the stress of high loads that typically bring about black-
outs.105 If payments providers are compromised by an increased load of in-
structions routed from other struggling providers, the remaining payments ar-
chitecture could become overloaded—even across national borders. 
The technological glitches that have plagued the trading of stocks and 
treasuries over the last decade also may provide some indication of how opera-
tional failures might cascade through the retail payments ecosystem. As these 
markets have become more technologically complex, trading decisions have 
been increasingly delegated to algorithms. Algorithms can malfunction (some-
times for a reason as simple as a mistaken key being pressed on a keyboard—
often referred to as a “fat finger” error),106 and on several occasions over the 
last decade, these algorithms have interacted in ways that have caused prob-
lems to cascade through markets, resulting in unexpected gyrations in the trad-
ing of assets, and thus, their prices.107 The initial triggers and cascading fail-
ures that caused such gyrations can remain inscrutable long after the event.108 
A technical failure at a payments provider (again, perhaps something as 
simple as a fat finger error or a lurking software bug) could interact with the 
automated components of other payments providers’ systems to create a cas-
cade of similarly inscrutable and problematic responses.109 The likelihood of 
                                                                                                                           
 103 See FIN. STABILITY BD., FINANCIAL STABILITY IMPLICATIONS FROM FINTECH: SUPERVISORY 
AND REGULATORY ISSUES THAT MERIT AUTHORITIES’ ATTENTION 19 (2017), http://www.fsb.org/
wp-content/uploads/R270617.pdf [https://perma.cc/T7NV-ZKVP] (explaining that multiple compa-
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 105 Dobson et al., supra note 58, at 026103-6. 
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109 The economic impacts of widespread technological problems in the retail payments system are 
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such transmission could be increased by the growing use of “application pro-
gramming interfaces,” (APIs) which allow the different software programs 
used by different payments providers to communicate directly with one anoth-
er.110 From a complexity science perspective, these APIs can be viewed as 
shortcuts that allow for payment instructions to flow more efficiently between 
the providers; increasing the number of shortcut links that exist between dif-
ferent parts of the retail payments ecosystem also will make it easier to trans-
mit problems from one part of the ecosystem to another.111 
Retail payments providers typically commit to getting critical processing 
systems back up and running within a specified time period after an operation-
al failure (for example, by the end of the day), but these commitments might 
ultimately prove unrealistic.112 If payments providers plan to recover by rout-
ing payments through an uncompromised alternative payments provider, they 
may be falling prey to the assumption that failures occur in isolation. As this 
Part has already explored, it is quite possible that other providers will suffer 
from the same problem at the same time, or will be overloaded by the addi-
tional traffic. The entire payments ecosystem could be compromised to varying 
degrees, leaving little in the way of alternative processing routes. It is an open 
question how long and how widespread an outage would have to be before 
broader economic growth were to become compromised, but any event that 
prevents a payments provider from identifying and/or transferring user funds 
would cut off commerce immediately for all users who rely on that provider 
for their exclusive means of transacting (because of identity verification re-
quirements, establishing access to an alternative electronic payment typically 
takes users some time).113 Even if a user already had established access to a 
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@perrysetgo/what-exactly-is-an-api-69f36968a41f [https://perma.cc/3VZF-CPBP] (explaining that an 
API is a piece of code that permits communications between different platforms). 
 111 See Ruhl, supra note 45, at 417–19 (regarding systemic risks associated with shortcut links). 
 112 See FFIEC, RETAIL PAYMENT SYSTEMS: IT EXAMINATION HANDBOOK 47 (2016), https://it
handbook.ffiec.gov/media/274860/ffiec_itbooklet_retailpaymentsystems.pdf [https://perma.cc/VW6U-
6MZL] (explaining that financial institutions and other financial providers should develop “business 
continuity plans” that aim for a service restoration time that is “reasonable for internal business units, 
other dependent financial institutions, and counterparties”). 
 113 Some countries (most notably India) are implementing national digital identities. Ross P. 
Buckley et al., Sustainability, FinTech and Financial Inclusion 17 (Univ. of Luxembourg, Working 
Paper No. 2019-006, 2019), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3387359 [https://
perma.cc/4LY3-2HEX]. Buckley et al. note that “Axis Bank was the first Indian bank to offer an 
eKYC facility in 2013, reducing the turnaround time for opening bank accounts from 7-10 days to just 
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substitute system for effecting payments, they would nonetheless be impaired 
if their transaction partners did not also have an alternative means of exchang-
ing funds with them. In other words, the inability of consumers to pay for 
goods and services would prevent the suppliers of those goods and services 
from receiving the funds they need to make their own payments, even if those 
suppliers had access to alternative physical means of making payments. 
Although the events of the financial crisis of 2007–2008 seemed to tran-
spire very quickly, the transmission of harm to the broader economy through 
credit channels was not instantaneous.114 Commercial activity, however, as 
well as the provision of many public services, could be impacted immediately 
if everyday transactions were disrupted.115 Without payments systems, people 
might be unable to make basic and time-critical purchases for things like food, 
transportation, and shelter.116 We might even see an immediate increase in theft 
and looting by people otherwise unable to obtain basic goods. The macroeco-
nomic consequences would be swift if creditors, suppliers, and employees 
were to remain unpaid for a prolonged period of time, preventing the “positive 
                                                                                                                           
one day.” Id. They go on to observe that, “[t]oday, many traditional banks and licensed payments 
banks in India offer accounts which can be opened and used instantly with eKYC.” Id. Other coun-
tries, however, may be averse to allowing the government to establish such a national identification 
system, meaning that some kind of private digital verification would be needed before a payments 
system could be used—if this has not been established in advance, then users still will face a lag time 
before they can access an alternative payments system. 
114 Economist Robert Solow provides an excellent description of how this transpired: 
What happened in the course of the financial crisis is that banks, insurance companies, 
and credit unions—all sorts of institutions whose normal business is to finance industry 
and people who want to buy cars and houses—they’ve been paralyzed. So businesses 
that would normally be investing in a new computer or a new fleet of trucks or whatev-
er that would need to borrow, can’t borrow. And if they could borrow, they would be 
paying a very high rate of interest. So they stop. And then the real economy begins to 
slow down, and people lose their jobs because their firms can’t sell to consumers, can’t 
sell to other businesses. A modern economy is a more complicated piece of machinery 
than a simple barter economy. Production is very complicated. You start with God 
knows what, and you end up with some extraordinarily complicated piece of equipment 
or the machinery that appears in my dentist’s office when I sit down. That can’t be di-
rected without a good deal of action which is taken now and can only pay off many 
stages later. And that’s where the credit mechanism comes in. Industry that depends on 
it has to slow down, simply because it can’t get the funds that enable each stage in pro-
duction to pay off the previous stage. 
What IF the Banking System Failed?, PBS NEWS HOUR (Jan. 11, 2011), https://www.pbs.org/news
hour/economy/what-if-the-banking-system-fai [https://perma.cc/ZUM7-4FRF]. 
 115 Johnson, supra note 47, at 552–53. 
 116 See Awrey & van Zwieten, supra note 27, at 799 (explaining that one of the risks in some 
types of payments systems arises when users employ that system for their everyday expenses and 
payments). 
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externalities” that flow from general commerce and trade.117 Collectively, few-
er transactions also would generate less tax revenue, and lowered tax revenues 
typically result in greater government debt,118 or even painful austerity 
measures.119 
Thus far, this Part has focused only on the potential impact of cascading 
technological problems. In reality, however, such cascading failures in the 
payments system are likely to implicate and intertwine technological and eco-
nomic forces. Because some of the component parts of the financial system are 
human actors, feedback effects are likely to be less predictable than in a purely 
technical system.120 Panic could create a run-like dynamic that harms the 
broader economy:121 for example, even if alternative payments processing 
were to remain technically available, panic regarding payments technology 
nonetheless might inspire withdrawals from banks and other payments provid-
ers as people try to hoard cash. Alternatively, people could limit the transac-
tions they carry out “with consumers delaying fund transfers to other business-
es and households to which they owe a payment, and which transferees were 
relying on those funds to satisfy other debts or operational expenses.”122 Such 
a chain of events could impact the macroeconomy.123 Or people might start to 
purchase and hoard goods because they fear that they will not be able to trans-
act in the future. As we have seen in economies afflicted with hyperinflation, 
such hoarding renders goods scarce, and if it persists, the economy begins to 
deteriorate.124 
The potential for an economic catastrophe to arise from cascading opera-
tional failures in the retail payments system justifies a more comprehensive 
approach to regulating for operational or infrastructure-related systemic risks. 
                                                                                                                           
 117 See Ricks, supra note 16, at 839 (quoting Richard Epstein, Freedom of Association and Anti-
discrimination Law: An Imperfect Reconciliation, LAW & LIBERTY (Jan. 2, 2016), https://lawliberty. 
org/forum/freedom-of-association-and-antidiscrimination-law-an-imperfect-reconciliation/ [https:// 
perma. cc/ZM22-XL2G]) (discussing the importance of the payments system to the commercial sys-
tem); see also Awrey & van Zwieten, supra note 27, at 809 (discussing how in the event that a pay-
ments system entity declares bankruptcy and regulators decide not to intervene, there are “potential 
externalities stemming from the inability of customers to pay creditors, suppliers, and employees”). 
 118 REINHART & ROGOFF, supra note 33, at 142. 
 119 See Allen, supra note 31, at 1106–07 (explaining the social cost of austerity measures). 
120 Steven L. Schwarcz, Regulating Complexity in Financial Markets, 87 WASH. U. L. REV. 211, 
233 (2009). 
121 See EISENBACH ET AL., supra note 1, at 6 (“Like any operational risk event, a cyber attack can 
trigger a liquidity run and lead to solvency issues.”). 
122 Christina Parajon Skinner, Regulating Nonbanks: A Plan for SIFI Lite, 105 GEO. L.J. 1379, 
1418 (2017). 
123 Id. 
124 Kimberly Amadeo, Hyperinflation: Its Causes and Effects with Examples, THE BALANCE (July 1, 
2020), https://www.thebalance.com/what-is-hyperinflation-definition-causes-and-examples-3306097 
[https://perma.cc/979C-TMC9]. 
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Although the prognosis for preventing normal accidents within the retail pay-
ments system is not particularly good, complexity science nonetheless offers 
suggestions on how to improve systemic robustness.125 Given the potentially 
catastrophic consequences of cascading payments failure, even incremental 
improvements are a worthwhile policy objective.126 Accepting the inevitability 
of normal accidents in the retail payments system also can spur good policy by 
encouraging the design of thoughtful emergency measures that might respond 
to future technological failures, to serve as a complement to regulation that 
seeks to make such failures less likely to occur in the first place. Although the 
retail payments system is in a moment of rapid change—which makes it chal-
lenging to assess the robustness of the system and how to improve it—the fol-
lowing Parts nonetheless will consider traditional retail payments providers as 
well as more recent entrants to the retail payments industry in terms of their 
impact on the overall robustness of the retail payments ecosystem. Building on 
this analysis, Part IV provides some policy suggestions intended to prioritize 
the robustness dimensions of modularity, scalability, and evolvability.127 
II. OPERATIONAL RISKS IN THE BANK-BASED RETAIL PAYMENTS SYSTEM 
The purpose of the retail payments system is to “facilitate the transfer of 
funds from debtors (payors) to creditors (payees) in satisfaction of financial 
obligations.”128 To do this, the payments system must be able to protect funds 
prior to and during transfer, and also must ensure that the transfer actually oc-
curs, at full value, in a timely fashion.129 Payments made using checks, cards, 
or electronic transfers are processed as a series of accounting changes to the 
parties’ deposit accounts as represented on ledgers maintained by the parties’ 
banks: a payer’s account is debited and a credit is made to the payee’s account 
in a corresponding amount.130 Because payers and payees often do not have 
accounts with the same bank, mechanisms are needed to reconcile accounting 
ledgers at different banks and transfer funds between them. 
For domestic payments, this process—known as clearing and settle-
ment—is facilitated by the existence of a central bank, such as the Federal Re-
                                                                                                                           
 125 See ARBESMAN, supra note 66, at 102 (noting that although increasingly complex systems can 
lead to additional issues, these same issues also can help us figure out how to fix problems in inter-
connected systems). 
126 See generally Allen, supra note 15 (providing an explanation of why a precautionary approach 
to financial stability regulation is justified). 
 127 See infra notes 292–348 and accompanying text. 
128 See Awrey & van Zwieten, supra note 27, at 781 (describing this transfer as an important 
component of both wholesale and retail payments systems). 
129 Id. at 782–83. 
130 CARNELL ET AL., supra note 4, at 71–73. 
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serve.131 Deposit-taking banks all have accounts with the central bank, and so 
debits can be made to the payer’s bank’s account at the central bank and credits 
can be made to the payee’s bank’s account.132 Over time, clearinghouses have 
emerged that make this process more efficient; “after sorting [payment instruc-
tions received from banks] and aggregating payments destined for the same 
bank, [they] then transmit information to each participating bank regarding the 
details of payments to be made to their accountholders.”133 In the United 
States, the clearinghouse for domestic retail payments is the Clearing House 
Interbank Payments System (CHIPS).134 The clearing and settlement of cross-
border payments is more complicated. This requires the settling of accounts 
through a network of correspondent banks—and there is often significant cost 
and delay associated with processing cross-border transactions.135 
Because banks historically have provided the bulk of retail payment ser-
vices—which have synergies with their deposit-taking and other functions— 
concerns about threats to the proper functioning of the retail payments system 
typically have been subsumed into discussions of the prudential regulation of 
banks, under the assumption that as long as banks remain safe and sound, retail 
payments processing will be protected.136 To be clear, the existing bank regula-
                                                                                                                           
131 Id. at 73. 
 132 The banks involved also will make the appropriate adjustments to the payer’s and payee’s 
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133 Awrey & van Zwieten, supra note 27, at 792. 
 134 Id. 
 135 Mills et al., supra note 18, at 18 (first citing COMM. ON PAYMENTS & MKT. INFRASTRUC-
TURES, BANK FOR INT’L SETTLEMENTS, CORRESPONDENT BANKING (2016), http://www.bis.org/cp
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Payments/Global_payments_2015_A_healthy_industry_confronts_disruption.ashx [https://perma.cc/
8L8N-3APR]). Mills et al. have noted: 
Currently, electronic cross-border payments are effected by credit (and sometimes deb-
it) transfers that convert funds from bank to bank through a series of correspondent 
banking relationships, often with an assessment of multiple fees. . . . According to one 
report, the settlement times for cross-border payments can take up to five days for the 
most common currency pairings, generally with limited clarity regarding the total 
amount of fees to be charged and the timing of settlement. 
Id. 
 136 See Awrey & van Zwieten, supra note 27, at 784 (explaining that regulators typically have 
focused on regulating banks when attempting to regulate payments systems in general). Broadly con-
strued, prudential rules manage the risks that financial institutions typically encounter with the goal of 
ensuring that such institutions fulfill their commitments to other financial institutions. They tend to 
focus on “capital adequacy, solvency, and liquidity” with less attention paid to operational risks. Iman 
Anabtawi & Steven L. Schwarcz, Regulating Ex Post: How Law Can Address the Inevitability of 
Financial Failure, 92 TEX. L. REV. 75, 87 (2013) (citing Kristin N. Johnson, Macroprudential Regu-
lation: A Sustainable Approach to Regulating Financial Markets, 2013 U. ILL. L. REV. 881, 884). 
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tory apparatus does not ignore operational risks. The regulatory agencies su-
pervising banks expect those banks to have “internal controls and information 
systems appropriate to the size of the institution and to the nature, scope, and 
risk of its activities and that provide for, among other requirements, effective 
risk assessment and adequate procedures to safeguard and manage assets.”137 
Regulatory agencies also expect banks to implement business continuity plans 
and cybersecurity risk management strategies and, starting in 2022, regulations 
will require banks to take into account past operational risk losses in calculat-
ing their regulatory capital requirements.138 There also are other regulatory 
measures targeted specifically at operational risks that might arise from the 
retail payments activities of banks, which will be explored in detail in this Part. 
All of these measures, however, are best thought of as “micro-operational 
regulation,” because they focus only on improving operational risk manage-
ment at individual banks, without thinking about potential systemic interac-
tions of such risks.139 Complexity theory suggests that focusing only on the 
reliability of individual components will make the system more fragile.140 This 
Part instead assesses existing payments regulation in terms of its ability to 
promote the varieties of robustness that are more likely to insulate the retail 
payments ecosystem from cascade failures. It concludes that there is a need for 
a “macro-operational” approach that promotes the modularity, scalability, and 
evolvability of the retail payments ecosystem as a whole. 
A. The Principles for Financial Market Infrastructures 
The Federal Reserve recently issued a Policy on Payment System Risk, 
which informs banks and bank holding companies supervised by the Federal 
Reserve of how they are expected to manage the risks associated with their 
payments processing activities.141 A significant and prescriptive portion of this 
policy statement is concerned with the terms on which the Federal Reserve 
                                                                                                                           
 137 Enhanced Cyber Risk Management Standards, 81 Fed. Reg. 74,315, 74,317 (proposed Oct. 26, 
2016). 
 138 BANK FOR INT’L SETTLEMENTS, OPERATIONAL RISK STANDARDISED APPROACH—
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 1, 2, https://www.bis.org/fsi/fsisummaries/oprisk_sa.pdf [https://perma.cc/
B82B-7HL4]. Starting in 2022, new regulations will require banks to take into account past operation-
al risk losses in calculating their regulatory and capital requirements. Id. 
 139 Concerns even have been raised about the neglect of systemic interactions of operational risks 
within individual financial institutions. Joshua Rosenberg, Exec. Vice President & Chief Risk Officer, 
Fed. Rsrv. Bank of N.Y., Thrive in Any Environment: Strengthening Resilience Through Risk Man-
agement (Nov. 6, 2019), https://www.newyorkfed.org/newsevents/speeches/2019/ros191106 [https://
perma.cc/Q3L3-WEL9]. 
 140 Ruhl, supra note 10, at 562 (citing Alderson & Doyle, supra note 10, at 839). 
 141 FEDERAL RESERVE POLICY, supra note 3, at 3. 
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will provide intraday credit to smooth payments processing.142 This portion of 
the policy is focused on the credit risks inherent in the bank-based payments 
system, and seeks to address these concerns by preventing the transmission of 
shocks through interbank credit exposures.143 The Federal Reserve’s policy 
also considers operational risk, however, which it defines as “the risk that defi-
ciencies in information systems or internal processes, human errors, manage-
ment failures, or disruptions from external events will result in the reduction, 
deterioration, or breakdown of services provided.”144 Although the policy does 
not engage with the possibility of operational failures cascading through the 
retail payments ecosystem, it does recognize that an operational risk at one 
payments provider may be transmitted through the credit channels to other 
payments providers.145 This is reason enough for the Federal Reserve to ad-
dress operational risks in its policy, which it does by reference to the Principles 
for Financial Market Infrastructures (PFMI) disseminated by the Committee on 
Payment Settlement Systems and the Technical Committee of the International 
Organization of Securities Commissions.146 
PFMI 17 provides that any provider of financial markets infrastructure: 
should identify the plausible sources of operational risk, both inter-
nal and external, and mitigate their impact through the use of appro-
priate systems, policies, procedures, and controls. Systems should 
be designed to ensure a high degree of security and operational reli-
ability and should have adequate, scalable capacity. Business conti-
nuity management should aim for timely recovery of operations and 
fulfillment of the FMI’s obligations, including in the event of a 
wide-scale or major disruption.147 
Principle 17 is complemented by Principles 2 and 3, which require internal 
governance and risk-management structures to be implemented to facilitate the 
identification and reduction of operational risk.148 Furthermore, Principle 20 
                                                                                                                           
 142 Id. at 15–31. 
 143 Id. 
 144 Id. at 5. 
 145 See id. (explaining that one financial institution’s issues “could create credit or liquidity prob-
lems for participants and their customers, the system operator, other financial institutions, and the 
financial markets”). 
146 Id. at 7–8. 
147 Id. at 35. 
148 See id. at 33 (explaining that Principle 2 requires institutions to develop effective governance 
standards as a means to “support the stability of the broader financial system,” and that Principle 3 
requires “a sound risk-management framework for comprehensively managing legal, credit, liquidity, 
operational, and other risks”). 
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provides that “[a]n FMI that establishes a link with one or more FMIs should 
identify, monitor, and manage link-related risks.”149 
With the exception of Principle 20, these principles should be viewed as 
promoting the reliability of individual components of the retail payments eco-
system, because they focus on steps taken by each payments provider on its 
own to protect itself by minimizing its risks. Principle 20 requires some con-
sideration of spillover effects to other institutions, but is far from comprehen-
sive. Although Principle 20 recognizes the possibility of links between institu-
tions that could transmit shocks from operational risks, it focuses on links that 
have been formally and consciously established (for example, through con-
tract), while neglecting the possibility of unanticipated additional linkages that 
could arise in a time of stress.150 There is insufficient focus within the PFMIs 
(and thus the Federal Reserve’s Policy on Payment System Risk) on the resili-
ence of the retail payments ecosystem as a whole, in terms of its scalability, 
modularity, and evolvability. 
Separate and apart from the PFMIs, the Federal Reserve Policy does in-
clude a general direction to payments providers to be mindful of systemic-level 
risks and externalities.151 It is questionable, however, whether individual pay-
ments providers have the incentives, or the capacity—in terms of both access 
to system-wide information and the ability to compel coordinated action—to 
address systemic operational risks on their own.152 Even banks with the best 
intentions face challenges in trying to coordinate to address systemic risks—
although the Payments Risk Committee does provide one forum for such co-
operation. 
                                                                                                                           
149 Id. at 35. 
 150 See id. (requiring that linked FMIs should be aware of and address “link-related risks”). 
151 Id. at 11, 13. 
 152 Allen, supra note 31, at 1103. For example, a wide-reaching survey of banking executives and 
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Id. at 3. 
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B. Payments Risk Committee 
The Payments Risk Committee is a private entity sponsored by the Feder-
al Reserve Bank of New York (New York Fed) that has “worked to identify, 
analyze and address risks in payments, clearing and settlement of financial 
transactions since its founding in 1993.”153 The New York Fed appreciates that 
the Committee could “be subject to antitrust scrutiny because [it] may bring 
together competitors to discuss economic, financial, and market conditions,” 
and thus requires the participant banks to abide by established antitrust guide-
lines that note that information sharing and coordinated action amongst Com-
mittee members may be problematic in some circumstances.154 The New York 
Fed’s Antitrust Guidelines do allow for the promulgation of jointly developed 
best practices, however, and the Committee has devised Best Practices for 
Payments, Clearing, and Settlement Activity that are intended to guide banks’ 
payments activities.155 
As with the Federal Reserve Policy discussed in the previous Section, 
there is a significant focus within the Committee’s Best Practices on mitigating 
the credit risks associated with delayed settlement of payments, but they also 
deal with operational risk and business continuity planning.156 For example, 
banks are encouraged to “[c]onduct frequent testing to help ensure the capaci-
ty, durability and redundancy of payment infrastructure in times of stress.”157 
They also are encouraged to “[c]ommunicate with customers, external [pay-
ments, clearing, and settlement] system providers, and other stakeholders as 
applicable should they experience an outage to avoid further delays in payment 
execution.”158 Relevantly, banks are advised to: 
Fully document and test business continuity/resiliency plans as part 
of operational risk management. These plans should include scenar-
ios that examine a significant interruption in access to the [large 
                                                                                                                           
 153 PAYMENTS RISK COMM., FED. RSRV. BANK OF N.Y., CHARTER 1 (last revised Nov. 2018), 
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value payment systems], as well as an alternative process to contin-
ue to execute time critical payments. The plan should be tested regu-
larly to ensure effectiveness and to minimize impact from a range of 
disruptive events, including minor system outages, facility disrup-
tions such as power outage, or a catastrophic scenario.159 
As with the Federal Reserve’s policy, the focus here is on the resilience of the 
individual providers within the retail payments ecosystem, with insufficient 
attention paid to possible systemic interactions. For example, a bank might 
adopt a business continuity plan that routes payments traffic to other providers 
in an emergency, without consideration of whether those other providers will 
be able to tolerate the overload without suffering some kind of operational 
breakdown themselves.160 In October 2012, the Committee did stage a simu-
lated exercise involving multiple banks that was intended as a training exercise 
on how to respond to a hypothetical data corruption affecting multiple banks, 
but that simulation was the exception rather than the rule.161 In reporting on the 
exercise, the Committee noted that firms typically “conduct[ed] their own 
business continuity and resilience exercises.”162 
C. Financial Market Utility Regulation 
At present, the primary way of regulating systemic operational risk in the 
retail payments system is through Title VIII of the Dodd-Frank Act, which au-
thorizes the Financial Stability Oversight Council (FSOC) to “designate those 
financial market utilities or payment, clearing, or settlement activities that the 
Council determines are, or are likely to become, systemically important” for 
enhanced regulation by the Federal Reserve.163 The only domestic retail pay-
ments utility or activity that has been designated to date is CHIPS.164 Title VIII 
contemplates that much of the regulation of designated utilities and activities 
will take the form of capital and margin requirements—again, reflecting an 
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expectation that harms will be transmitted through credit channels.165 It also, 
however, gives the Federal Reserve broad leeway to consider other issues, in-
cluding “the ability to complete timely clearing and settlement of financial 
transactions” to “support the stability of the broader financial system.”166 
To implement Title VIII, the Federal Reserve has adopted Regulation 
HH.167 In doing so, it has drawn heavily on the PFMIs, so it is not surprising 
that Regulation HH focuses heavily on credit risk, and leaves much of the 
management of operational risk to the financial market utility itself.168 None-
theless, Regulation HH contains important directions to Financial Market 
Utilities (FMUs) to focus on scalability and evolvability in establishing their 
operational risk management policies and procedures.169 It also sets out param-
eters for business continuity planning in the event of an operational failure, 
establishing the goal of same-day resumption of settlement services even in a 
worst-case scenario.170 Section 234.4(b) of Regulation HH also expressly au-
thorizes emergency changes to be made to a FMU’s rules, procedures, and op-
erations if its ability to provide services in a safe and sound manner is com-
promised.171 Viewed through the complexity science framework, this provision 
allows for feedback protocols to be implemented, quickly altering the opera-
tion of the system to increase robustness in response to identified problems. 
In summary, most of the existing regulation of the bank-based retail pay-
ments ecosystem attempts to limit the impact of operational risks on individual 
banks, but neglects the possibility of systemic operational risks. Regulation HH 
is incomplete, but as a mechanism for promoting the robustness of a complex 
payments processing ecosystem, it does have some helpful features. Changes 
are afoot in the retail payments industry, though, and to the extent that new 
entrants are neither banks nor covered by Regulation HH, any existing efficacy 
of the current regulatory system will be undermined. It is possible that these 
                                                                                                                           
165 See MARC LABONTE, CONG. RSCH. SERV., R41529, SUPERVISION OF U.S. PAYMENT, CLEAR-
ING, AND SETTLEMENT SYSTEMS: DESIGNATION OF FINANCIAL MARKET UTILITIES (FMUS) 20 
(2012), https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R41529.pdf [https://perma.cc/45DE-C5EP] (discussing the rele-
vant capital and margin requirements). 
166 Dodd-Frank Act § 805. 
 167 12 C.F.R. § 234.1 (2020). 
168 See supra notes 141–152 and accompanying text. 
169 12 C.F.R. § 234.3(a)(17). Regulation HH requires a “designated financial market utility” to 
enact “a robust operational risk-management framework” that, relevantly, “[h]as systems that have 
adequate, scalable capacity to handle increasing stress volumes and achieve the designated financial 
market utility’s service-level objectives” and “[h]as comprehensive physical, information, and cyber 
security policies, procedures, and controls that address potential and evolving vulnerabilities and 
threats.” Id. 
170 Id. § 234.3(a)(17)(vi)–(vii). 
 171 See id. § 234.3(b) (noting that “[t]he Board, by order, may apply heightened risk-management 
standards to a particular designated financial market utility” if it thinks it is necessary to address 
risks). 
484 Boston College Law Review [Vol. 62:453 
new entrants could promote the robustness of the retail payments ecosystem in 
other ways, including by abandoning complex legacy systems and by provid-
ing alternative payments processing services that increase redundancy in the 
ecosystem. If these new entrants lack the capacity to scale up and evolve, how-
ever, then they may increase the complexity of the retail payments system in a 
way that makes normal accidents more likely. The next Part, therefore, evalu-
ates selected payments developments from a complexity perspective. Because 
the credit risks posed by these new entrants have yet to be theorized fully, and 
because credit and operational risks can intertwine in a crisis, the next Part also 
considers the risks that these new entrants may pose from a credit perspective. 
III. RECENT RETAIL PAYMENTS INNOVATIONS 
Existing financial regulation seeks to ensure the stability of the retail 
payments ecosystem by applying prudential rules to the banks that currently 
provide the bulk of the retail payments processing services, and to financial 
market infrastructure like CHIPS. As Part I of this Article has explored, these 
regulatory approaches were developed in light of historical understandings of 
how financial crises evolve, and as a result, their focus on operational risk is 
insufficient. Operational risks are becoming an increasingly important issue as 
the technological complexity of new payments providers increases. To illus-
trate these evolving risks, this Part looks at the case studies of Venmo, Alipay, 
Bitcoin, Ripple, JPMCoin, and Facebook’s Libra. This is by no means a com-
plete list of new payments innovations, but the providers chosen here serve as 
a reasonably representative selection of retail payments innovations in devel-
oped economies as of the time of this writing.172 
This Article focuses on operational failures, but operational failures of re-
tail payments systems would most likely intertwine with, and be exacerbated 
by, the defaults, runs, and credit crunches that have characterized past crises.173 
For example, an operational failure could sap public confidence in the ability 
of payments providers to ensure the safe custody and transfer of customer 
funds, triggering a run on one or more payments providers. An affected pay-
ments provider then may be forced to default on customer requests to with-
draw their funds or to liquidate assets, which, if the payments provider in ques-
tion also provides credit, could lead that provider to stop lending. The inverse 
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is also possible: a payments provider experiencing a run could find that its 
technological infrastructure is unable to support the increased load of withdrawal 
requests and fail, which would only further damage confidence in that provider 
and reinvigorate the vicious cycle. 
Although this Article has critiqued the operational risk regulation of banks 
as insufficient, existing prudential regulation does a good, if imperfect, job of 
addressing the runs and credit crunches that an operational failure at a bank 
could trigger. The same cannot be said for the newest crop of non-bank pay-
ments providers, which are often purposely structured to avoid prudential regula-
tion. As a result, customer funds held with non-bank payments providers typical-
ly do not have the protection of deposit insurance, nor are they exempted from 
bankruptcy regimes that could freeze customer assets at any moment.174 In the 
absence of such protections, customers have incentives to withdraw their funds 
at the first sign of trouble with the payments provider—particularly because the 
complexity of the technology makes the risks more opaque and therefore more 
difficult to assess.175 When approaching these new types of payment services, 
policymakers therefore should be concerned about operational risks acting as a 
trigger for runs, as well as the systemic interactions of operational risks. This 
Part considers both operational and credit risks for these new technologies. 
A. Venmo 
Venmo is a peer-to-peer payments provider that describes itself as a way 
to “[s]end and receive money with Venmo friends.”176 In addition, Venmo 
serves as something of a social media platform, permitting “users to attach 
subject lines, emojis and comments to a transaction, which then populate a 
single feed.”177 In 2018, Venmo facilitated sixty-two billion dollars worth of 
payments, which users can make with money held in a Venmo account or a 
linked bank account.178 Users who receive funds through Venmo can quickly 
move those funds to a linked bank account, but it is also possible for a user to 
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maintain a balance in a Venmo account.179 Because it is not a bank, however, 
Venmo is not authorized to take deposits.180 It therefore uses carefully struc-
tured and well-disclosed relationships with regulated banks to avoid regulators 
construing balances carried in Venmo accounts as unauthorized deposits.181 
Instead, users have only an unsecured claim against Venmo until the funds are 
transferred to a linked bank or credit card account.182 Although not a bank, 
Venmo does qualify as a “money transmitter,” and is therefore covered by the 
Bank Secrecy Act and subject to various registration, reporting, and record-
keeping requirements designed to address money laundering.183 Furthermore, 
Venmo is subject to state money transmitter laws, and has money transmitter 
licenses in all forty-eight states that require them.184 
Using the traditional prudential lens to assess new technological pay-
ments providers like Venmo, Awrey and Van Zwieten have raised concerns 
about their financial stability implications.185 Venmo customers assume that 
funds held in a Venmo account will always be immediately available for trans-
actions, but customers may be surprised to learn that Venmo may have de-
ployed the funds for other purposes or the funds may be commingled with 
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Venmo’s other assets in a bankruptcy situation.186 Venmo would be unable to 
take advantage of measures like deposit insurance and special resolution re-
gimes that disincentivize runs by assuring bank customers that their funds will 
continue to be available at all times.187 As a result, fear about the unavailability 
of their funds may cause Venmo customers to withdraw their funds rapidly in 
the future—a dynamic very similar to a run.188 
The concerns raised by Awrey and Van Zwieten are valid. We also should 
consider payments providers like Venmo from a complexity science perspec-
tive, however. In that light, prudential regulation designed to allay the concerns 
that Awrey and Van Zwieten have raised would increase the reliability of 
Venmo (and similarly structured payments providers) as individual compo-
nents of the retail payments ecosystem. But, as discussed in Part I.B, steps tak-
en to make individual components of the payments system more reliable are, in 
isolation, insufficient to make the system as a whole more robust. Attention 
also must be paid to the impact of Venmo on the modularity, scalability, and 
evolvability of the retail payments ecosystem. 
With or without prudential regulation, there are reasons to be concerned 
that the rise of new payments providers like Venmo will make the payments 
system as a whole more fragile.189 Venmo is essentially an intermediary that 
facilitates the transfer of funds from one regulated bank account to another—
albeit in a fun and efficient way.190 Although Venmo has sped up and simpli-
fied the consumer experience in terms of effecting payments, it has in fact 
complicated the legal path of funds from user to user by adding extra interme-
diaries to the chain of institutions involved in processing the payment.191 
Venmo, and other digital payment services like it, have therefore been de-
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scribed as “new technologies running on old rails.”192 Complexity scientist 
Sam Arbesman has observed that one of the major causes of technological 
glitches is the building of a new system on the foundation of an outdated lega-
cy system.193 To rephrase this using the terminology from Part I.B, being teth-
ered to outdated payments rails could limit the scalability and evolvability of 
new components of the payments system, necessitating complicated, and likely 
error-prone, fixes if Venmo wants to grow and change over time. 
To some degree, modularity is improved by adding new payments provid-
ers like Venmo to the retail payments ecosystem, but if a problem occurs in the 
bank payments infrastructure upon which Venmo and others rely (as opposed 
to Venmo’s proprietary system), then any improvement to the modularity of the 
system is illusory. All payments providers relying on that infrastructure will be 
incapacitated together. In such circumstances, rather than serving as an alterna-
tive module or substitute, Venmo actually makes the system more fragile by 
increasing the number of interconnections in the payments system, and thus 
the number of opportunities for something to go wrong.194 In sum, the in-
creased complexity that comes from adding another link to the chain of institu-
tions involved and from building more layers of code on legacy bank payments 
systems, coupled with the speed at which payments are effected, should give 
us pause. Because of their additional complexity and speed, we should be con-
cerned about all of the new mobile payment services providing shortcuts be-
tween outdated rails—even those, like ApplePay, that do not allow users to 
store positive balances of funds and therefore do not seem particularly con-
cerning when viewed through a prudential lens.195 
B. AliPay 
AliPay is a Chinese payments provider that was established in 2004, ini-
tially to facilitate purchases on the Alibaba e-commerce platform.196 It has 
since evolved into a leading payments platform that facilitates “peer-to-peer” 
transactions between acquaintances, as well as allowing customers to pay mer-
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chants directly for goods and services.197 Payment instructions are sent by 
scanning a QR code—a type of barcode assigned to every user of AliPay—
which sends a message to debit and credit the respective AliPay digital wal-
lets.198 Only one party to the transaction needs to be online and scan the QR 
code to consummate the transaction.199 Like Venmo, AliPay is not operated by 
a bank, but money is transferred into and out of the AliPay system by linking 
to a bank account,200 although users often carry a balance in their AliPay digi-
tal wallet or even invest the funds in other financial products offered by com-
panies affiliated with AliPay.201 Unlike Venmo, however, which ultimately uses 
bank payments infrastructure to process payments, AliPay operates on its own 
proprietary infrastructure.202 Furthermore, AliPay has over one billion users 
and processes more than twenty trillion worth of payments annually, a reach 
far exceeding that of Venmo.203 Indeed, AliPay and its main competitor, the 
popular WeChat Pay, have become so successful that the Chinese retail pay-
ments system is no longer viewed as “bank-based,”204 which has necessitated a 
change in how prudential risks are managed in China.205 
A fulsome discussion of the Chinese mobile payments system is beyond 
the scope of this Article, but AliPay is discussed here because its use is not 
limited to China. In the United States, AliPay has established relationships 
with high-end retailers, duty-free stores, taxi companies, and the Walgreens 
drug store chain, thus allowing customers to pay by scanning a QR code with 
their phones, just as they would in China.206 AliPay’s stated ambition is to pro-
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vide services for Chinese nationals visiting or living in the United States,207 
which makes sense in light of the inadequacies of the current system for pro-
cessing cross-border payments.208 Many believe, however, that AliPay eventu-
ally will compete for business from U.S. residents at large.209 U.S. merchants 
might be amenable to using AliPay because it dispenses with the significant 
processing fees currently charged to them in connection with credit card trans-
actions.210 Although there are other costs associated with using AliPay and 
there are many other reasons to be skeptical about AliPay’s ability to take over 
significant market share in the United States and other developed economies, 
such an outcome is not impossible.211 Furthermore, even if it remains a niche 
service, it is worth considering the impact that AliPay could have on the ro-
bustness of the retail payments ecosystem in the United States. 
Given that AliPay operates on its own proprietary infrastructure, it could 
enhance the modularity of the retail payments ecosystem in the United States. 
In the event that bank-based payments infrastructure is compromised, the 
AliPay system could continue to work in parallel, offering a potential alterna-
tive for purchasing some goods and services. It is particularly noteworthy that 
payments can be consummated on AliPay as long as one party to the transac-
tion is online, even if the other party’s technology is compromised.212 Also, 
because it is not weighed down by legacy systems, AliPay may be more scala-
ble and evolvable than something like Venmo, even though Venmo and AliPay 
seem to provide similar services to their customers. 
AliPay would only work as a true alternative, however, to the extent that 
users maintained a balance in their AliPay digital wallets and did not need to 
transfer funds into those wallets from their bank accounts. Furthermore, despite 
the potential contributions to the robustness of the retail payments ecosystem, it 
may not be good policy to rely on redundancy generated by a payments provider 
that is so integrally involved with a foreign government (the United States re-
cently prevented Ant Financial, AliPay’s parent company, from acquiring 
MoneyGram International, a U.S. money transfer company, because of potential 
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national security threats).213 The remainder of this Part therefore considers other 
“alternative payments rails” that could improve the modularity of the U.S. retail 
payments ecosystem, and are not as closely linked to any foreign government. 
C. Bitcoin & Ripple 
Bitcoin was the first significant “cryptocurrency,” a type of privately-
issued money that relies on cryptography for the verification of transactions.214 
For the purposes of this Article’s examination of the robustness of payments 
processing, the most important feature of Bitcoin is the distributed ledger on 
which transactions are recorded. A “distributed ledger” is essentially an online 
database that provides a permanent record of all the transactions that have ever 
been verified by the persons maintaining that ledger.215 The ledger technology 
is “distributed” in the sense that there are multiple devices serving as “nodes” 
that run the software that hosts the database.216 The devices that serve as nodes 
will have varying abilities, depending on the protocol that is adopted by the 
developers of the distributed ledger.217 For example, some nodes may only be 
able to validate new transactions; others may also be authorized to alter the 
code of the ledger itself, or to issue new “coins” or “tokens.”218 
A payment effected using a distributed ledger is settled when it is record-
ed on that ledger, after the transaction has been verified by the relevant 
nodes.219 In a permissionless distributed ledger, the rules embodied in its pro-
tocol confer the right to verify transactions, and to accept the updated version 
of the ledger, upon all of the nodes in the system, which decide by consen-
sus.220 With this sort of distributed ledger, some mechanism is needed to pro-
tect the ledger from nodes controlled by nefarious actors. For example, Bitcoin 
protects its permissionless ledger by requiring that a node complete a mathe-
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matical proof of work before it participates in the consensus process.221 If the 
distributed ledger relies on authorized persons rather than a cryptographic pro-
cess to ensure the validity of the transactions on the ledger, however, it is re-
ferred to as a “permissioned” distributed ledger.222 Whether permissioned or 
permissionless, because all transactions are recorded as transfers of ownership 
on a single distributed ledger, distributed ledger technology avoids the ineffi-
ciencies and errors associated with reconciling disparate bank ledgers to pro-
cess payments.223 
As I have argued previously, the efficiencies associated with the use of 
the distributed ledger reduce the need for credit to smooth the settlement pro-
cess, and therefore, can eliminate some of the credit-related risks inherent in 
the payments system.224 When a distributed ledger is used to facilitate transac-
tions in bitcoins, however, a new type of run risk is introduced into the system. 
Bitcoin’s viability as a means of exchange is entirely dependent on the will-
ingness of market participants to accept it at any given moment. Because 
Bitcoin is not backed by a government, central bank, or commodity, confi-
dence that it will continue to be accepted is fragile, and there could be runs on 
it if that confidence were to evaporate.225 Recognizing this fragility, Ripple 
Labs created a distributed ledger that can be used to process transactions in 
sovereign currencies, in addition to its native virtual currency, XRP.226 
Like Bitcoin, the Ripple distributed ledger relies on a decentralized, albeit 
permissioned, network of users to verify transactions.227 From a complexity 
perspective, decentralized distributed ledgers have some features that will ren-
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der the payments system more fragile, and others that will enhance its robust-
ness. Unlike payments made using Venmo, payments processed using distrib-
uted ledger technologies are not burdened by legacy system foundations or 
links to the traditional payments processing infrastructure. Instead, they can be 
considered to be their own payment rails—independent modules that could 
generate redundancy and robustness of the payments ecosystem.228 Further-
more, the decentralized nature of these payments rails means that if one partic-
ipating node were to fail, the payments system could continue to function. In 
this way, these distributed ledger networks have significant redundancy built 
into their core technologies and create redundancy at the systemic level by 
providing alternative payments processing.229 These technologies also were 
developed in an era of cyber attacks, and therefore were designed from the 
outset to be robust to them.230 
These are real contributions to the robustness of the payments system, but 
their benefits may dissipate over time. Work is being undertaken to make dif-
ferent distributed ledgers “interoperable.”231 APIs and other programs could 
tether the different ledgers so that they are more likely to fail together.232 Addi-
tionally, there is the potential for quality control issues to arise, particularly if 
the APIs are user-created.233 There also are other features of these distributed 
ledger technologies that are likely to introduce new fragilities into that system. 
The software protocols underpinning the distributed ledgers themselves are 
complex, error-prone systems.234 Remedial steps continually are being taken to 
improve the quality of these protocols, but in doing so, the complexity of the 
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make it unreliable “as financial market infrastructure”). 
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protocols is increased, rendering them more fragile to unanticipated events.235 
In addition, software protocols that are decentralized and open source, such as 
those used for Bitcoin and Ripple Labs,236 require consensus from a broad group 
to implement changes that may be needed to fix problems or cope with greater 
volumes of payments, which may limit their scalability and evolvability.237 
It is challenging to coordinate changes to any software when there is no 
one “in charge” of it.238 Even when there is agreement amongst the code de-
velopers, the lack of centralized control can result in coordination problems, 
and the situation becomes significantly more challenging if the developers dis-
agree on proposed changes. Ultimately, changes cannot take effect unless they 
are adopted by the majority of the users in the network, which means that nec-
essary fixes will not be adopted if the majority does not approve.239 One way 
of addressing this gridlock is to create a “hard fork,” a situation where the dis-
tributed ledger splits in two with each branch using a different software proto-
col from that time on240 (one journalist described the concept of a hard fork 
using the analogy of “a new version of Microsoft Word, which generates doc-
uments that can no longer be opened via the older versions”).241 In August 
2017, for example, a hard fork was used to resolve the “civil war” over the size 
of the blocks of data in the Bitcoin distributed ledger (changes to the block size 
would allow for quicker processing of Bitcoin transactions).242 Successive hard 
forks that split the distributed ledger into increasingly smaller subsets, howev-
er, are not a sustainable solution to the problems of scalability and evolvability. 
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After all, payments systems benefit from network effects—the more users they 
have, the more useful they become.243 
These limitations on scalability and evolvability are likely to be less con-
straining for permissioned blockchains, as the same central authority that grants 
permission to nodes to approve transactions can pressure those nodes to adopt 
changes to the underlying software.244 For example, although there still may be 
some coordination problems for the Ripple protocol, many of the users who have 
been granted permission to use it are financial institutions who could be directed 
to act in a particular way by a financial regulator or self-regulatory organiza-
tion.245 Ripple’s integration with regulated banks creates other problems, howev-
er. Fragilities at individual financial institutions could come to impact the Ripple 
blockchain. In other words, it would undermine the modularity of the retail 
payments ecosystem, if banks and Ripple are all likely to fail together. 
D. JPMCoin 
Whereas bitcoins and Ripple’s XRP are purely digital assets, some of the 
newer virtual currencies have been designed to derive their value from tangi-
ble, real world assets in an attempt to moderate their volatility. Virtual curren-
cies backed by some form of collateral typically are referred to as “stable-
coins.”246 JPMCoin, however, goes further than stablecoins by converting di-
rectly into U.S. dollars held by JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A., at a 1:1 ratio.247 
Launched in February 2019, JPMCoin is a prototype virtual currency that the 
bank is now testing with its institutional clients.248 JPMCoin can be distin-
guished from Bitcoin and Ripple because it is redeemable for U.S. currency at 
a pegged rate.249 It also can be distinguished because it will run on its own 
proprietary centralized permissioned ledger, meaning that JPMorgan, rather 
than members of the public, will hold the power to approve transactions and 
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make changes to the software operating the ledger.250 In short, JPMCoin has 
dispensed with proof of work and other design features that make cryptocur-
rencies so complex, and pared down the distributed ledger into a pure pay-
ments processing technology. 
For those in the crypto community who are ideologically committed to 
payments without centralized control, the development of JPMCoin is deeply 
unsatisfying.251 As one journalist observed, “[I]t lacks the fundamental qualities 
that have made cryptocurrencies so radical: the freedom from middlemen and 
from regulatory oversight.”252 JPMCoin has some clear advantages over Bitcoin 
and Ripple, however. By dispensing with the cryptographic elements of transac-
tion verification, using JPMCoin to effect payments will be much more efficient 
than using Bitcoin.253 Furthermore, JPMCoin is issued by JPMorgan Chase 
Bank, N.A., a highly regulated bank that is subject to significant levels of pru-
dential regulation, which will contribute to its reliability. More important than 
efficiency and reliability from a complexity science perspective, though, is the 
fact that JPMCoin will operate on a centralized, permissioned blockchain.254 
This means that it will be easy to implement changes to the distributed ledger’s 
code as it needs to adapt—thus improving the scalability and evolvability of 
this payments processing method. From a credit perspective, JPMCoin also 
seems reasonably insulated from runs: it is issued by a bank that has access to 
the Federal Reserve as a lender of last resort and deposit insurance from the 
FDIC, and it is backed by JPMorgan Chase’s “$2.6 trillion balance sheet.”255 
Although JPMCoin initially might seem like a beneficial development 
from a stability perspective, it is questionable whether it will actually increase 
redundancy within the retail payments ecosystem. Payments services gain 
utility from network effects, meaning that they become more valuable when 
they allow for payments to a larger group of recipients. At present, you need to 
be a JPM customer to send or receive JPMCoin, so it does not serve as a good 
                                                                                                                           
 250 See Hankin, supra note 222 (noting that “JPM coin is anything but permissionless” because it 
is based on a blockchain operated by JPMorgan). 
 251 See id. (arguing that because JPMCoin is neither permissionless nor decentralized, it should 
not be considered a cryptocurrency). 
 252 Michael J. de la Merced & Nathaniel Popper, JPMorgan Chase Moves to Be First Big U.S. 
Bank with Its Own Cryptocurrency, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 14, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/02/
14/business/dealbook/jpmorgan-cryptocurrency-bitcoin.html [https://perma.cc/P3DB-A2KS]. 
 253 For a discussion of the inefficiencies of Bitcoin’s transaction verification process, see Allen, 
supra note 214, at 930–32. 
 254 See supra notes 69–73 and accompanying text (discussing why scalability, modularity, and 
evolvability are often more important than efficiency and reliability when it comes to establishing 
robust systems). 
 255 See J.P. Morgan Creates Digital Coin for Payments, supra note 247 (explaining that JPMCoin 
will be protected by JPMorgan’s “$2.6 trillion balance sheet” and the various banking regulations to 
which JPMorgan, as a large bank, is subject). 
2021] Payments Failure 497 
substitute for most existing payment methods, which do not require payers and 
payees to be affiliated with the same financial institution.256 Therefore, at pre-
sent, JPMCoin is unlikely to make the overall retail payments ecosystem more 
robust. One commentator, however, has noted that JPMorgan’s ledger “is de-
signed to interact with any ‘standard’ blockchain,” and it is possible that in the 
future JPMCoins could be used to transact outside of JPMorgan’s proprietary 
distributed ledger.257 Increased interoperability could make JPMCoin more 
useful as a payment method, but also could create a situation where the differ-
ent ledgers are more likely to fail together. It is therefore unclear at present 
whether JPMCoin’s net impact on the stability of our payments system is like-
ly to be positive or negative. 
If, however, JPMCoin were to achieve significant scale as a means of 
payment, it could compromise the Federal Reserve’s ability to use monetary 
policy to address future financial instability—which is a key feedback mecha-
nism used to make the financial system more robust.258 This certainly would be 
a negative impact. JPMorgan has stated that it created JPMCoin solely to allow 
it to use distributed ledger technology to facilitate speedier payments.259 How-
ever, “[s]keptics questioned why a blockchain ledger was necessary to move 
money between JPMorgan bank accounts.”260 Although it has not made any 
public statements to this effect, JPMorgan also may be seeking to benefit from 
the seigniorage it can receive for creating JPMCoins.261 A bank like JPMorgan 
already can profit from seigniorage when it creates new money by extending 
U.S. dollar loans to others,262 but regulations, such as reserve and capital re-
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quirements, impose limits on the ability of private banks to extend loans in 
U.S. dollars,263 and thus, cap private seigniorage profit. 
Furthermore, banks have no right to create U.S. dollars for their own spend-
ing—that right belongs solely to the Federal Reserve. JPMorgan could create 
JPMCoins for its own spending, though.264 At least at present, JPMCoins are not 
subject to reserve and capital requirements, and so JPMorgan could also theoret-
ically make unlimited loans in JPMCoins.265 Market participants may be willing 
to pay more than one dollar for a JPMCoin if it is a more useful payment mech-
anism than a U.S. dollar.266 As the first global bank to develop a proprietary dis-
tributed ledger, JPMorgan may be in a position to achieve this outcome by using 
its ledger as a bottleneck to squeeze out competitors.267 In short, JPMCoin could 
become a very lucrative business line, and to the extent that significant volumes 
of transactions are consummated in JPMCoins, the Federal Reserve will have 
lost some of its control of the money supply—and with it, its ability to take 
emergency actions to address financial instability.268 
E. Libra 
Whereas JPMCoin is an example of an established financial institution 
diversifying its technological offerings, the inverse also is happening: the larg-
est technology companies are starting to make moves into the finance space.269 
Perhaps no technological venture into finance has generated more controversy 
than that proposed by the Libra Association, a not-for-profit organization pio-
neered and currently led by Facebook.270 In June 2019, the Libra Association 
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issued a white paper introducing the world to its proposal for a “a simple glob-
al currency and financial infrastructure that empowers billions of people.”271 
After receiving significant pushback from national authorities, the Libra Asso-
ciation issued a second white paper in April 2020 that made some changes and 
offered some clarifications to the initial proposal. Most notably, the second 
white paper includes a proposal to issue Libra coins denominated in dollars, 
Euros, and several other sovereign currencies, in addition to the global Libra 
currency announced in 2019. 
Both of the white papers are relatively short, but they include enough in-
formation to provide a preliminary analysis of Libra’s potential impact on the 
retail payments ecosystem. The first white paper outlines the following three 
key features of Libra: 
1. It is built on a secure, scalable, and reliable blockchain; 
2. It is backed by a reserve of assets designed to give it intrinsic val-
ue; 
3. It is governed by the independent Libra Association tasked with 
evolving the ecosystem.272 
The proposed Libra blockchain bears many similarities to the distributed ledg-
ers already discussed in this Part. It will be decentralized but permissioned, 
with each of the members of the Libra Association charged with maintaining 
one of the validation nodes.273 Because it aspires to create a new payment rail 
that can be used to facilitate domestic and cross-border payments, this block-
chain could facilitate a more modular retail payments ecosystem. By using a 
reserve of assets identified as “cash or cash equivalents and very short-term 
government securities”274 to back each type of Libra coin, Libra is seeking to 
solve the volatility problems that have so far prevented cryptocurrencies like 
Bitcoin from becoming a real alternative to existing payments processing 
methods.275 
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From a prudential perspective, the proposal to rely on a reserve of assets 
to maintain a stable value for each type of coin is the most problematic feature 
of Libra. The first white paper states that Libra coins will have an “intrinsic” 
value,276 but in reality, that value will vary depending on the composition and 
valuation of the reserve of assets.277 In this sense, Libra bears similarities to 
money market funds. When someone invests in a money market fund, they are 
purchasing a share in a mutual fund that invests in short-term liquid assets that 
are considered to be reasonably safe.278 The value of a share in a money mar-
ket fund will fluctuate depending on the market value of the assets that the 
fund has invested in, but because those assets are considered to be largely risk-
free, the SEC has authorized money market funds to use a specific form of ac-
counting that allows the share to consistently be valued at one dollar, so long 
as the underlying asset value does not drop too far.279 This creates the percep-
tion that a share in a money market fund has a stable value. As with money 
market funds, however, assurances from the Libra Association that each Libra 
has a stable value are likely to make the currency more susceptible to runs if 
something goes awry. In 2008, a money market fund with investments in Leh-
man Brothers was unable to maintain its one dollar per share value (in industry 
parlance, it “broke the buck”).280 This resulted in a widespread fear that all 
money market funds might be less stable than previously thought, and signifi-
cant numbers of investors sought to redeem their shares.281 To satisfy these 
redemption requests, funds sold their best and most liquid assets for cash, cre-
ating incentives for remaining investors in the funds to redeem their shares as 
quickly as possible, lest they be left with a share in a fund that already had dis-
posed of all of its good investments.282 
A similar run dynamic could befall Libra. The Libra white papers antici-
pate that a holder of a Libra coin will be able to exchange it for their preferred 
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sovereign currency. Libra holders will be reliant on third-party dealers to ex-
change their Libra coins for sovereign currencies, except in extreme circum-
stances when the Libra Network (a subsidiary of the Libra Association that 
will manage the reserves) will facilitate “burning Libra Coins for end users and 
liquidating assets comprising the Reserve to make payment as appropriate.”283 
In these circumstances, the Libra Network presumably would have to start ex-
changing or selling the most liquid assets from their reserve to meet the con-
version requests.284 Remaining holders of Libra coins who feared that the val-
ue of their coins would plummet against sovereign currencies as the reserve is 
depleted would be incentivized to convert their Libra into sovereign currencies 
as early as possible, creating a vicious cycle. This vicious cycle would likely 
have impacts outside of Libra itself. As Professor Katharina Pistor notes: 
All of this would matter less if Libra were just one of many other 
cryptocurrencies that have entered and exited, risen and fallen, over 
the past decade. Libra’s ambition, however, is of a different kind. It 
wants to be a global currency and, if allowed to go forward, would 
be rolled out at breathtaking speed by Facebook, a company that 
currently has over 2.5 billion users worldwide.285 
There would likely be significant feedback effects from a run on Libra, with 
assets from the reserve being dumped into the markets at an unprecedented 
scale. Such asset fire sales can generate significant externalities for the finan-
cial system as a whole.286 
The money market fund panic of 2008 ultimately was staunched by guar-
antees from the Federal Reserve, but there would be no equivalent body to per-
form that function for the global Libra coins.287 With respect to the Libra coins 
that are denominated in sovereign currencies, the relevant national authorities 
would have more scope to intervene, but bailouts for Facebook might prove 
politically challenging to pursue. Libra thus poses risks from a credit perspec-
tive; we also should be concerned about Libra from an operational perspective. 
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Although it is free from the baggage of legacy systems, the software establish-
ing the Libra blockchain is intended to be open source, meaning it will itself 
become a legacy system that complicates the development of the products de-
signed to be built on top of it.288 User-designed applications also may create 
linkages between this blockchain and legacy payments systems, thereby un-
dermining the modularity of the system. Libra also has the potential to under-
mine redundancy within the retail payments ecosystem. Given the number of 
Facebook users around the world, the network effects of a Facebook-run pay-
ments system would be significant, and it is plausible that Libra could outcom-
pete other payments systems to become the dominant global infrastructure.289 
Also troubling from an operational perspective is the lack of clarity re-
garding the governance of the Libra Association. As with Bitcoin and Ripple, 
the scalability and evolvability of Libra will depend on the ability to coordi-
nate changes to its distributed ledger as circumstances change. The first white 
paper claims that the Libra blockchain will be designed to “prioritize scalabil-
ity . . . and future adaptability.”290 If there are impediments to coordinating 
changes, however, then Libra will become more fragile, and if it becomes an 
important component of the retail payments ecosystem, then the whole ecosys-
tem will become more fragile. The white paper provides little clarity on how 
the members of the Libra Association will interact. Professor Chris Brummer 
has queried: 
Are members required to act in the best interest of the currency (and 
by extension the currency stakeholders) or are they permitted to put 
their financial interest first? Are there any public policy or contrac-
tual commitments they have with respect to assisting in the mainte-
nance of financial stability and financial integrity?291 
                                                                                                                           
 288 See LIBRA WHITE PAPER 2019, supra note 270, at 3, 4 (providing that the Libra software is 
open source). 
 289 See BIS, supra note 200, at 67 (“Once a captive ecosystem is established, potential competi-
tors have little scope to build rival platforms. Dominant platforms can consolidate their position by 
raising entry barriers. They can exploit their market power and network externalities to increase user 
switching costs or exclude potential competitors.”). 
 290 LIBRA WHITE PAPER 2019, supra note 270, at 3. 
 291 Examining Facebook’s Proposed Cryptocurrency and Its Impact on Consumers, Investors, 
and the American Financial System: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Fin. Servs. 7, 116th Cong. 
(2018) (written statement of testimony by Chris Brummer, Agnes N. Williams Research Professor 
Director, Institute of International Economic Law, Georgetown University Law Center), https://
financialservices.house.gov/uploadedfiles/hhrg-116-ba00-wstate-brummerc-20190717.pdf [https://
perma.cc/T4JS-9DML] (emphasis omitted). Finally, Libra has ambitions to transition to a permission-
less blockchain eventually, which would further complicate its scalability and evolvability as a pay-
ments provider. See LIBRA WHITE PAPER 2019, supra note 270, at 4 (discussing Libra’s future as a 
permissionless blockchain); supra notes 237–244 and accompanying text (discussing the limits on 
scalability and evolvability in permissionless blockchains). 
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IV. A MACRO-OPERATIONAL APPROACH 
The new payments innovations surveyed in the previous Part seem to be a 
mixed bag in terms of their contributions to the modularity, scalability, and 
evolvability of the retail payments ecosystem. As such, it is hard to predict 
whether the process of fintech innovation will have a net positive or net nega-
tive impact on the robustness of our retail payments ecosystem. We therefore 
should not expect individual firms in the private sector to be able to resolve 
concerns about operational risk in the retail payments ecosystem. Given the 
possibility that cascading operational failures could incapacitate society’s abil-
ity to transact, policy-makers and regulators need to engage with evolving op-
erational risks proactively. 
The previous Part also raised the possibility of new forms of prudential 
risk arising from new retail payments innovations. Although these are still 
evolving, academics and policy-makers already are starting to consider how to 
address them. The Chinese central bank, for example, recently has required 
non-bank payments providers, like AliPay, to sequester all customer funds in a 
reserve account in order to promote confidence that those funds will continue 
to be available—and to reduce the risk of runs.292 Other reform possibilities 
that have been discussed include establishing private third-party insurance of 
funds used in unregulated payments systems, and requiring payments provid-
ers to have a relationship with a regulated bank.293 Although important, pru-
dentially oriented reform efforts such as these are insufficient if the retail pay-
ments ecosystem is viewed through a complexity theory lens. At best, pruden-
tial rules can improve the resilience of the new components of the retail pay-
ments ecosystem, but they will not directly address the scalability, modularity, 
and evolvability dimensions of the ecosystem as a whole. At worst, such pru-
dential reform efforts could create a false sense of security—rendering the 
components themselves more robust to expected problems while making the 
payments ecosystem as a whole more susceptible to unexpected problems that 
could trigger catastrophic cascade failures. Regulatory approaches targeted at 
the robust yet fragile dimensions of the retail payments ecosystem are a neces-
sary complement to prudential regulatory policy. 
At present, the specter of systemic operational risk is dealt with by regu-
lating the FMUs, like CHIPS, where such risk is concentrated.294 This Article 
has argued not only that this approach is presently insufficient, but also that if 
new technologies (particularly distributed ledger technology) succeed in taking 
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over a significant amount of retail payments processing, then focusing solely 
on CHIPS will be an even more inadequate approach to addressing systemic 
operational risk. Just as financial regulators have moved towards a “macro-
prudential” approach to managing credit-related risks in the decade since the 
last crisis, a new “macro-operational” perspective is needed that contemplates 
the possible systemic impacts of cascading operational failures.295 To use the 
complexity science terminology adopted in Part I.B, macro-operational policy 
should seek to promote redundancy within the ecosystem, and to establish sen-
sors and feedback mechanisms to detect and respond to macro-operational 
threats.296 This Part explores possible measures of this kind, which are de-
signed to make cascading operational failures less likely and to respond when 
such failures do occur. 
Before doing so, however, this Part briefly discusses why ex ante regula-
tion is necessary. Given the sometimes inevitable nature of “normal acci-
dent[s],”297 there is a temptation to be somewhat fatalistic about their occur-
rence and focus primarily on ex post mechanisms to deal with such accidents 
once they occur.298 Although ex post mechanisms will likely remain necessary 
and should be planned for in advance, past experience with financial crises 
suggests that such ex post responses are often insufficient to fully contain the 
damage unleashed by such crises.299 Furthermore, the ex post strategies that 
are currently in the regulatory arsenal have been developed to respond to the 
credit-driven dynamics of financial crises and are therefore inadequate to re-
spond to crises that are driven primarily by operational failures.300 As such, 
both new ex ante and new ex post tools need to be developed. 
Historically, one of the most effective ways of mitigating emerging finan-
cial instability has been for a central bank to act as a lender of last resort, lend-
ing freely to banks against good collateral to prevent those banks from having 
to sell their assets at a steep discount into a distressed market—thus preventing 
a temporary liquidity problem from transforming into a solvency problem.301 A 
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lender of last resort would have a very limited role to play, however, during a 
cascade of operational failures through the retail payments ecosystem. At best, 
a lender of last resort could assist by mitigating any credit-related fallout that 
might arise if people lose confidence in financial institutions as a result of their 
inability to transact. The Federal Reserve took steps in this direction in the 
wake of September 11, 2001, following classic Bagehotian policy in making 
credit available to lubricate interbank payments following massive operational 
failures.302 A lender of last resort would not be equipped to resolve any techno-
logical glitch, or to provide alternative processing infrastructure, however. 
Special resolution and deposit insurance regimes for banks are also de-
signed to maintain confidence so as to prevent the runs that could incapacitate 
those banks.303 Again, these safety nets seek to address concerns about the sol-
vency of banks and their ability to satisfy creditors, and they would not be able 
to stop a cascading operational failure that could spread even without a deple-
tion of confidence in the system.304 Instead, different kinds of regulatory strat-
egies—again, both ex ante and ex post—are required to better insulate the re-
tail payments system from cascading operational failures. The complexity 
framework provides a way of thinking about how regulation should respond to 
an uncertain future. 
A. Sensors and Feedback 
A system can be made more robust to internal and external shocks by put-
ting in place sensors that enable the system “to evaluate itself internally, to de-
tect changes in its environment, and to measure its interactions with other . . . 
systems.”305 A robust retail payments ecosystem therefore requires reporting 
mechanisms that facilitate the transfer of information regarding operational 
problems from the providers that comprise that system to a central regulator.306 
Ideally, the information would be reported in real time, and at a granular level, 
but real-time regulatory monitoring is highly experimental at present, with lim-
ited resources being devoted to experimentation with operational risk monitor-
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ing.307 It is not unrealistic to expect that such technology eventually will be 
developed, but unless and until that happens, information transfer will have to 
take the more traditional form of somewhat delayed reports from regulated 
entities to their regulator about operational problems that have occurred. The 
utility of these types of reports is also limited because financial regulators lack 
jurisdiction over many of the new payments providers. An extension of regula-
tory jurisdiction, authorizing the appropriate regulators to compel reports of 
operational mishaps from non-bank providers, would help address this—but 
such a proposal is beyond the scope of this Article. 
Assuming they have the necessary jurisdiction, regulators also could de-
vise their own sensors, designed to look for systemic interactions. For exam-
ple, existing prudential regulation uses stress tests as sensors to evaluate how 
the largest financial institutions would fare in hypothetical scenarios of great 
economic stress. The regulatory capital requirements for those institutions then 
are adjusted in light of the results of those stress tests; this works as a feedback 
mechanism.308 A macro-operational approach to payments system regulation 
also should incorporate stress tests; here, the stress scenario would focus less 
on negative macroeconomic indicators and more on hypotheticals about worst 
case technical failures. As I have argued previously, when it comes to assessing 
the new risks created by fintech technologies, the stress scenarios employed 
should not be “engineered towards testing for a particular outcome, but instead 
should be designed to find out ‘what would happen if.’”309 Our sense of the 
types of entities and activities that pose the greatest risks to the financial sys-
tem could shift as we start testing for cascading technological failures, rather 
than limiting the focus of testing to the ability of institutions to comply with 
capital requirements under stressed economic conditions. 
Netflix uses something called “chaos monkey” to shut down parts of its 
system randomly in order to learn more about the connections therein, as well 
as the ability of those connections to transmit cascade failures.310 Although the 
consequences of payments failure are much greater than an unavailable movie, 
some variation on this theme—perhaps a simulation of shutting down parts of 
the system—could assist in understanding the pathways through a constantly 
                                                                                                                           
 307 See SIMONE DI CASTRI ET AL., FIN. STABILITY INST. (FSI), FSI INSIGHTS ON POLICY IMPLE-
MENTATION NO 19: THE SUPTECH GENERATIONS 10 (2019), https://www.bis.org/fsi/publ/insights19.
pdf [https://perma.cc/93ML-SKEA] (providing a graphical representation of the share of suptech 
innovation devoted to reporting, misconduct analysis, data management, virtual assistance, market 
surveillance, microprudential supervision, and macroprudential supervision). 
 308 For background information on prudential stress testing, see Berner et al., supra note 175, at 
3–6. It should be acknowledged that adjustable regulatory capital requirements make the financial 
system as a whole more complex, and thus more fragile in some respects. 
 309 Allen, supra note 109, at 200. 
 310 ARBESMAN, supra note 66, at 107. 
2021] Payments Failure 507 
evolving ecosystem. Breakthroughs are also being made in the field of novelty 
detection, where artificial intelligence is being utilized to “find unexpected out-
comes in a system.”311 Recently, this type of technology has been used to detect 
changes in retail payments flows that could serve as early warning signals of 
credit-related problems with payments providers.312 Presumably, it also could be 
used to identify unusual payments flows that signal operational problems. 
Novelty detection and other new technologies could prove very helpful as 
sensors for evaluating the robustness of an evolving retail payments ecosys-
tem. Before these types of sensors can be effective, however, some kind of 
map of the components of the retail payments ecosystem and their relation-
ships with one another will be required.313 Again, fragmented jurisdiction over 
retail payments providers is likely to limit our understanding of the systemic 
dimensions of operational risks. Assuming that these jurisdictional issues can 
be solved sufficiently to allow regulators to test for and detect problems with 
systemic potential, regulators will have a range of options. 
In the face of an impending cascading failure, some form of circuit breaker 
could be deployed to stop the problem from spreading to the rest of the system. 
For example, to avoid overloading other parts of the retail payments ecosystem, 
regulators might intervene to prevent a compromised payments provider from 
routing its customers’ payments through other providers. Although this certainly 
would have significant ramifications for those dependent on the compromised 
provider for transaction processing, it could preserve the overall retail payments 
ecosystem, and thus, protect economic growth more broadly. Such decisions are 
not easily made, however, because of the unequal distribution of their conse-
quences—without any due process, unelected officials will sacrifice the ability 
of some people to transact in order to preserve the ability of others to do so. Sim-
ilar issues were raised in late 2019 when PG&E cut power to some, but not all, 
residents of the San Francisco Bay area to thwart the spread of local wild-
fires.314 Financial regulators might therefore be loath to use a circuit breaker 
except in the most dire circumstances. 
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If a cascade failure is not imminent, a more measured response to a de-
tected problem might be to revise operational risk management regulations. As 
discussed in Part II, Section 805 of Dodd-Frank authorizes the Federal Reserve 
to implement rules that are more comprehensive than the current Regulation 
HH. Specifically, Section 805 allows the Federal Reserve to prescribe stand-
ards for any payments activities that the FSOC has designated as systemically 
important.315 As an example of the type of standards that might work as macro-
operational regulation, complexity scientist Sam Arbesman has noted that 
computer programmers often pay little attention to features of programs like 
“how numbers get stored and rounded when performing calculations.”316 These 
types of errors could metastasize into significant operational risks, and regula-
tion could provide some rigor and consistency here. Implementing new regula-
tions will inevitably increase the complexity of the ecosystem, however. 
Regulatory complexity is particularly likely to increase if distributed 
ledgers with dispersed governance become more prominent, as there is often 
no identifiable person responsible for managing the operational risk associated 
with those ledgers, and thus, no obvious candidate for regulation.317 Work-
arounds for this type of problem, such as regulating virtual currency interme-
diaries in lieu of those operating the distributed ledger itself—as New York’s 
BitLicense has done—will make the regulatory landscape even more com-
plex.318 Given the fragilities that result from increasing complexity, in some 
circumstances the correct approach might be to refrain from making new rules, 
and simply to study the detected glitch to learn more about how payments in-
frastructure operates as a system. In this way, interconnections that can pro-
duce much larger cascade failures may be better understood.319 Arbesman has 
argued that when it comes to exceedingly complex systems, the best approach 
is to “examine the anomalies and malfunctions to gain insights, even if we 
don’t fully understand the system as a whole.”320 The understanding gleaned 
from such an approach, albeit imperfect, will be key to interpreting infor-
mation provided by sensors in the future and determining whether some type 
of circuit breaker is warranted in the event of an emergency. 
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Unfortunately, the natural candidate to perform these types of functions in 
the United States, the Office of Financial Research (OFR), has seen its re-
sources decimated under the Trump administration.321 Rebuilding the OFR 
should be a priority for the Biden administration—but it should not be rebuilt 
solely with personnel guided by the credit theory of financial crises. The Biden 
administration should seek to hire data and complexity scientists as it rebuilds 
the OFR, so that the agency does not view data about operational glitches sole-
ly through established narratives about how financial crises occur.322 
B. Recovery and Repair 
Dirk Helbing has argued that, in order to facilitate recovery and repair, “it 
is necessary . . . to prepare and exercise contingency plans for all sorts of pos-
sible failure cascades.”323 In theory, this makes eminent sense, but it may not 
always be practically possible to do so. As challenging as it is to predict the 
types of cascade failures that could incapacitate the retail payments ecosystem, 
it is doubly challenging to figure out how to resolve such failures should they 
occur. Eisenbach et al. have noted that “if a cyber attack were to compromise 
the integrity of banks’ systems, the reconciliation and recuperation process 
would be an unprecedented task.”324 The same can be said for any technologi-
cally driven cascade failure, even if not initiated by a nefarious actor. It will 
first take time to determine the systemic interactions that generated the prob-
lem—merely identifying the trigger will not be enough.325 Even assuming an 
accurate diagnosis, solutions will be difficult to develop, and take time to im-
plement. In the interim, something drastic like a regulator-mandated suspen-
sion of all payment services may be needed to allow payments providers time 
to recover and repair the impacted systems.326 Even if such a suspension is the 
most expeditious way to restore payments services, there still will be signifi-
cant economic fallout. Thus, given the challenges involved with recovery and 
repair, it makes sense to consider policies designed to ensure that there is an 
alternative way of transacting available. 
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C. Measures to Ensure Redundancy 
Because building in redundancy is a well-recognized way of increasing 
the robustness of complex systems, a macro-operational approach to payments 
regulation should contemplate measures that promote redundancy within the 
retail payments ecosystem.327 At the same time, payments systems benefit 
from network effects, and thus, become more convenient, efficient, and valua-
ble when a provider allows for payments to a larger group of recipients.328 A 
more modular retail payments ecosystem with redundant parts would be de-
prived of some of these network effects, likely requiring the retention of some 
of the cross-ledger reconciliation processing that currently slows down pay-
ments processing (particularly at the cross-border level).329 Regulatory policy 
therefore will face a challenging balancing act between promoting redundancy 
and efficiency. 
The appropriate balance ultimately will be informed by our confidence in 
the sensors, feedback loops, and recovery mechanisms available. Less redun-
dancy in the retail payments ecosystem would be required if: (1) sensors exist-
ed that could alert regulators to issues that arise as payments systems take on 
increasing numbers of transactions and incorporate new technological devel-
opments; (2) feedback loops could be implemented that allowed regulators 
time to respond to signals from those sensors before a crisis develops; and (3) 
if recovery and repair measures could be designed in advance. 
If, however, we have limited faith in these sensors, feedback loops, and 
recovery measures, a prudent approach to macro-operational risk management 
would be to build extra redundancy into the retail payments ecosystem, even at 
the cost of efficiency. At least while macro-operational sensors and interven-
tion mechanisms are in their experimental phase, regulators should err on the 
side of caution and encourage such redundancy.330 
There are a number of regulatory strategies that could be employed to 
promote redundancy in the retail payments ecosystem. Perhaps the most politi-
cally palatable strategy would be to lower regulatory barriers to entry to en-
courage entrepreneurs and innovators to make inroads into the industry and 
provide alternative payments processing services. Many jurisdictions are doing 
just this, with the adoption of regulatory sandboxes and special purpose char-
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ters designed to reduce the amount of regulation applicable to fintech innova-
tors.331 In theory, adopting measures such as these could “allow a thousand 
payment systems to bloom,” creating a diversity of payments processing mod-
ules. In reality, however, the network effects associated with payments pro-
cessing make such an outcome unlikely. When the provider of payments ser-
vices is a large tech company, such as Facebook, the likelihood of industry 
consolidation is particularly strong because such firms “can establish and en-
trench their market power through their control of key digital platforms, e.g., 
e-commerce, search or social networking.”332 Indeed, because of tendencies in 
the tech industry towards monopoly, simply reducing regulatory barriers to 
entry could very well result in fewer redundancies, not more. 
If reducing regulation will not promote redundancy, adapting existing 
regulatory structures might be able to do so. Pursuant to Section 805 of Dodd-
Frank, the Federal Reserve theoretically could promulgate rules that limit the 
volume of transactions that a particular payments provider could process, pro-
moting modularity by making room for competitors. As a complementary ap-
proach, the Federal Reserve could adopt rules limiting interoperability under 
Regulation HH. There are, however, reasons to be skeptical that such ineffi-
ciency-inducing steps would be viable in our current political climate (before 
the Federal Reserve can regulate payments infrastructure or activities, they 
must first be subjected to heightened regulatory standards by the FSOC which 
is chaired by the Treasury Secretary—a political appointee).333 There are there-
fore, at least at present, limitations on the ability of regulators to use Title VIII 
to prevent consolidation in the payments industry. Moreover, antitrust laws, 
which also could have a role to play in promoting redundancy,334 are underuti-
lized in the United States when it comes to financial infrastructure.335 
Another alternative would be for national authorities to themselves pro-
vide a substitute payments service that adds redundancy to the system—perhaps 
                                                                                                                           
 331 Hilary J. Allen, Experimental Strategies for Regulating Fintech, 3 J. L. & INNOVATION 1, 19–
24 (2020). 
 332 BIS, supra note 200, at 73. 
 333 See Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (Dodd-Frank Act) 
§§ 111(b)(1), 804, 12 U.S.C. §§ 5321, 5463 (explaining how the FSOC determines whether certain 
payments systems are or will be “systemically important,” thus rendering them part of the Federal 
Reserve’s regulatory purview). 
 334 See BIS, supra note 200, at 68 (“[B]ig techs’ activity in finance may warrant a more compre-
hensive approach that encompasses not only financial regulation but also competition and data privacy 
objectives.”). 
 335 For a discussion of this issue, albeit with a focus on derivatives clearinghouses rather than 
retail payments processing infrastructure, see Felix B. Chang, Financial Market Bottlenecks and the 
“Openness” Mandate, 23 GEO. MASON L. REV. 69, 70–71 (2015). 
512 Boston College Law Review [Vol. 62:453 
as a “payment system of last resort.”336 There is currently significant interest in 
developing central bank-sponsored virtual currencies to “protect the pre-
eminence of public money in a digitalised economy.”337 These essentially would 
be digital versions of sovereign currencies and certainly could function as a dis-
tinct and alternative payments rail that improves the robustness of the retail 
payments ecosystem. Some have expressed credit-related reservations about 
these virtual sovereign currencies, though. The concern is that if people prefer 
these currencies to bank deposit accounts as a place to store their money, banks 
will be deprived of much of the deposit funding they currently rely upon to 
make loans, thus limiting the availability of credit and growth.338 Concerns 
have also been raised about the ability of central banks to carry out monetary 
policy, which they traditionally have implemented through their interactions 
with privately-owned banks, if private banks are rendered superfluous.339 In a 
recent white paper, however, Ricks et al. have argued that even if depositors 
place their funds with a central bank, there can be a continued role for private-
ly owned banks as lenders who engage in the time-intensive activity of screen-
ing borrowers—funding those loans with money borrowed from the central 
bank.340 From a credit perspective, then, the adoption of digital sovereign cur-
rencies may not be problematic. Indeed, Ricks et al. have argued that the provi-
sion of retail payments services by a central bank is a solution to the many cred-
it-related fragilities that can inspire panics in our current financial system.341 
In fact, Ricks et al. have even argued that no virtual currency is needed to 
create a new central bank-sponsored retail payments processing system.342 
They have proposed that instead of relying on distributed ledger technology, 
the Federal Reserve simply should scale up its existing ledgers to allow for 
crediting and debiting balances for retail customers, which it already does for 
wholesale customers.343 Using these ledgers, the Federal Reserve could just 
start offering bank accounts to retail customers, so that “[a] user-friendly web 
and smartphone interface would support free and instant peer-to-peer payments 
between FedAccount holders.”344 Even though Ricks et al. make a series of 
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compelling arguments as to why their proposal would improve financial stability 
from a prudential perspective, operational concerns remain. From a redundancy 
perspective, the most obvious risk is that any government-provided payments 
service—be it the FedAccount proposed by Ricks et al. or a central bank-
sponsored virtual currency—would be too successful, outcompeting all the pri-
vate sector alternatives to become the only viable processor of payments. 
One partial solution to the need for redundancy may be to implement pol-
icies that preserve the usefulness of cash (meaning physical currency issued by 
a sovereign government). Although electronic transfers are increasingly sup-
planting the use of cash for day-to-day payments345—some commentators have 
even gone so far as to call for the abandonment of cash altogether346—part of 
the solution to macro-operational risks in our retail payments ecosystem may 
be to ensure that we do not lose existing redundancies that might be able to 
pick up the slack if the electronic alternatives fail entirely. For example, Con-
gress could amend its definition of “legal tender” in 31 U.S.C. § 5103 to re-
quire private persons to accept cash as payment for goods and services—they 
are not currently required to do so, and many businesses have “gone cashless” 
as a result.347 Such an amendment certainly would inject inefficiencies into the 
retail payments ecosystem, but the redundancy would improve the robustness 
of the overall system.348 
CONCLUSION 
There is no foolproof way of preventing technological problems from 
cascading through our retail payments ecosystem, amplifying as they interact 
to paralyze the workings of our economy. The potential gravity of such a fail-
ure, however, justifies policy measures that seek to make such an outcome less 
likely or less severe. Unfortunately, our extant framework of crisis-prevention 
tools neglects the possibility of normal accidents and cascading operational 
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that 31 U.S.C. § 5103 currently does not require businesses and individuals to accept cash payments). 
 348 As an aside, such a policy also would benefit the many members of society who do not have 
access to electronic financial services, and who are thus increasingly marginalized in a cashless society. 
For a report on this issue, see Ginia Bellafante, How the Cashless Economy Shuts Out the Poor, N.Y. 
TIMES (Dec. 6, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/12/06/nyregion/how-the-cashless-economy-
shuts-out-the-poor.html [https://perma.cc/C8TN-CA2H]. 
514 Boston College Law Review [Vol. 62:453 
failures. A new regulatory framework is therefore needed that takes the poten-
tial systemic interactions of operational risks seriously. This Article has argued 
for the development of a “macro-operational” regulatory approach that is 
based in the lessons of complexity theory. Such an approach is only becoming 
more necessary as new financial technologies are developed that make our re-
tail payments system even more complex, and thus, more prone to cascading 
failures. 
This Article’s conclusion regarding the need for macro-operational regu-
lation is not just applicable to the retail payments system; the increasing com-
plexity of the financial system ensures that all financial regulators need to be 
open to the possibility of cascading operational failures that can impact finan-
cial stability. This Article has provided some preliminary thoughts on what 
macro-operational regulation of the retail payments ecosystem might look like, 
but a broader conversation regarding macro-operational regulation could find 
its start in the Advance Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (ANPR) promulgated 
in 2016 by the OCC, Federal Reserve, and FDIC on Enhanced Cyber Risk 
Management Standards.349 Although this endeavor was shelved, this ANPR 
poses probing questions about how to determine which sectors’ operations are 
critical enough to deserve heightened regulation, how to assess which entities 
pose systemic operational risk, and which methodologies are best for measur-
ing cyber risks. This inquiry should be broadened beyond cyber-related risks to 
operational risks more broadly—the answers to these questions could then 
generate the beginnings of a new regulatory approach designed to address the 
possibility of future financial crises that could develop outside of the credit 
channels of systemic risk. 
                                                                                                                           
 349 See generally Enhanced Cyber Risk Management Standards, 81 Fed. Reg. 74,315 (proposed 
Oct. 26, 2016) (proposing rules on “enhanced standards to increase the operational resilience” of fi-
nancial institutions). 
